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INTRODUCTION

During the three decades he spent working as a machinist for
the United States Navy, Henry Plummer suffered continuous
exposure to the asbestos used in the insulation, gaskets and pipe
coverings of warships.1 In late 1999, a biopsy confirmed that he had
developed mesothelioma, a gruesome type of cancer that kills all those
who contract it and is caused only by asbestos. 2 In an effort to combat
his cancer, Mr. Plummer embarked on a long, painful course of
treatments that included chemotherapy and the removal of his left
lung in April 2000. 3 In early 2001, however, Mr. Plummer's doctor
informed him that new tumors had emerged, this time in his right
lung. 4 He was subsequently placed on a ventilator and died in October
5
2001.
Before his death, Mr. Plummer retained an attorney and filed a
lawsuit against more than twenty makers of asbestos products. 6
Several defendants settled before trial, and a jury awarded Mr.
Plummer a $3.1 million verdict against one specific defendant, AC&S. 7
Before Mr. Plummer's widow received any money, however, several of
the settling defendants, including Owens-Corning and Fibreboard,
filed for bankruptcy protection.8 Faced with the threat that AC&S
would do the same, Mrs. Plummer agreed to settle her claim
confidentially for an amount substantially less than the trial award. 9
After paying her attorney's thirty-three percent of the award in
addition to other expenses associated with the trial and her husband's
illness, Mrs. Plummer will be left with less than $1 millionl°--a

1.
Susan Warren, Competing Claims: As Asbestos Mess Spreads, Sickest See Payouts
Shrink, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at Al (discussing the impact of claims by unimpaired
asbestos plaintiffs on the payments received by the seriously ill, and describing several case
studies), 2002 WL-WSJ 3392934.
2.
See Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriageof Justice: Asbestos Lawyers Are Pitting
Plaintiffs Who Aren't Sick Against Companies That Never Made the Stuff-and Extracting
Billions for Themselves, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 154, available at 2002 WL 2190334; Warren,
supra note 1.

3.
Warren, supra note 1.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. Id. (noting that annual medical costs for the treatment of mesothelioma can exceed
$200,000, and that most insurance companies will not pay for all of the necessary treatments
because many are still considered to be experimental).
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substantial sum of money, but certainly not one commensurate with
the injury her husband suffered as a result of his exposure to asbestos.
Unlike Henry Plummer, James Curry was not continually
exposed to asbestos over a period of decades.1 1 Instead, his job only
12
called for him to occasionally handle asbestos-containing products.
Also unlike Mr. Plummer, Mr. Curry was not so unfortunate as to
contract mesothelioma. 13 Instead, Mr. Curry and his co-plaintiffs
alleged only that they suffered from mild asbestosis, a nonmalignant
(although, in particularly severe cases, fatal) respiratory tract
condition caused by inhaling asbestos fibers, and resulting lung
abnormalities such as "scars, marks, opacities, and other
imperfections in the lungs that show up in X-rays."'14 Rather than
losing one lung to asbestos-related cancer and having his other lung
infested with tumors that would ultimately claim his life, a 65 yearold Mr. Curry was still able to enjoy a daily three to four mile walk
when his suit went to trial. 15 In fact, Mr. Curry's alleged asbestos
injuries were so slight that four different doctors testified at trial that
he suffered from "no asbestos-related condition whatsoever."'16 These
facts, however, did not stop a Mississippi jury from awarding $150
million to Mr. Curry and his five similarly situated co-plaintiffs in
October 2001.17 Ironically, the jury ordered that sixty percent of the
award given to Mr. Curry and his co-plaintiffs be paid by AC&S-the
same company against which Mrs. Plummer was forced to settle her
claim out of fear that the company would file for bankruptcy
protection.18 The jury came to this decision despite the fact that
AC&S, which is based in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, "never had offices
in Mississippi, never performed contracts at any of the sites where the
plaintiffs worked, and sold few asbestos-containing products
anywhere."19
Unfortunately, the cases of Mr. Plummer and Mr. Curry are
not aberrations. Instead, they provide a paradigmatic illustration of
some of the tremendous shortcomings of the current asbestos claims
resolution process. These shortcomings are the result of a tangled web

11.
12.
13.

Parloff, supra note 2, at 155.
Id.
Id.

14.

Id.; see also TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 157 (Clayton L. Thomas, M.D.,

M.P.H. et al. eds., 18th ed. 1997) (providing a definition of asbestosis).
15. Parloff, supra note 2, at 155.
16. Id.
17.

Id.

18.

Id. at 166; Warren, supra note 1.

19.

Parloff, supra note 2, at 166.
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of interrelated problems. Plaintiffs such as Mr. Curry, who have little
if any physical impairment, are now responsible for eighty percent or
more of all new and pending asbestos claims. 20 The increasing volume
of claims filed by unimpaired plaintiffs is clogging the dockets of
courts across the country, 21 especially in certain jurisdictions seen as
being particularly hospitable to asbestos plaintiffs. 22 In order to deal
with these massive numbers of claims, courts are increasingly forced
to implement various procedural shortcuts, most notably mass
consolidation of asbestos claims. 23 This approach has had the
unforeseen and harmful side effect of encouraging more asbestos
claims by unimpaired plaintiffs. 24 The result is the creation of a
vicious cycle: judges feel forced to turn to aggregation to deal with the
overwhelming numbers of claims being filed, particularly by
unimpaired plaintiffs, but their willingness to aggregate cases only
serves to encourage more filings, often by unimpaired plaintiffs.
The mass consolidations often feature plaintiffs with widely
varying levels of asbestos exposure and vastly differing injuries (or no
injuries at all) having their claims joined for a single trial against a

20. See Queena Sook Kim, G-I Holdings' Bankruptcy Filing Cites Exposure in Asbestos
Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at B12 (noting that up to eighty percent of current asbestos
settlements are paid to the unimpaired), 2001 WL-WSJ 2850312; Richard 0. Faulk, Asbestos
Litigation in State Court: Why the System Is Broken and Some Suggestions for Repair, 3 CLASS
ACTION LITIG. REP. 658, 669 (2002); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the
Never-Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2001) (stating that "[a]s many as 80% of new
cases are brought by plaintiffs who suffer from no physical impairment"); see also The Baron and
His Fiefdom, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2002, at A14 (reporting that claims by unimpaired plaintiffs
actually comprise ninety percent of the current asbestos filings), 2002 WL-WSJ 3407050.
21. See Alex Berenson, A Surge in Asbestos Suits, Many By Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2002, at Al (reporting that the filing of new asbestos claims has increased steadily since
1997, with at least 90,000 filed in 2001, and that as many as 2.5 million suits might be filed
before asbestos litigation begins to fade around 2030), 2002 WL 18538000.
22. See Rothstein, supra note 20, at 15-16. Mississippi's liberal joinder rules and reputation
for awarding large jury verdicts to unimpaired asbestos plaintiffs have caused the state to
become a haven for asbestos claims. See MISS. R. Civ. P. 20. One particularly noteworthy
illustration is Jefferson County, where the number of asbestos claims filed since 1999 has
exceeded the county's population. Jerry Mitchell, Jefferson County Ground Zero for Cases,
CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 17, 2001, at Al. The shift of cases to Mississippi has
been further encouraged by the implementation of tort reform in Texas, an early asbestos
litigation battleground. See Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1922 (2002).
23. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1822, 1873-81 (1992); Rothstein, supra
note 20, at 14-20.
24. See Rothstein, supra note 20, at 2, 8-9; Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to
the Nation's Trial Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency Is Hurting You and Innocent Victims in
Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 247, 248-51 (2000); infra Part II.C.

20031

MAKES SENSE TO ME

1953

group of defendants with extremely disparate levels of culpability. 25
Despite these differences, however, evidence concerning all plaintiffs'
claims against all defendants will be presented to a single jury
charged with deciding all of the consolidated claims. The result is that
even those defendants facing highly questionable claims are
frequently forced to settle rather than take the risk that a jury like the
one in Mr. Curry's case will return a huge verdict that forces them
into bankruptcy. 26 In what asbestos defendants must regard as a
particularly cruel twist, the value of questionable claims actually
increases as the economics of mass aggregation forces defendants to

settle. 27
Every time an unimpaired plaintiff such as Mr. Curry receives
any settlement or jury award, another asbestos defendant is driven
closer to bankruptcy and the pool of funds available for truly injured
claimants is further depleted. 28 This problem is only exacerbated by
the consolidation-fueled increase in the value of such dubious claims.
At least fifty-five companies have now been driven into bankruptcy by
asbestos liability, and the number is steadily increasing, with at least
twenty of those filings coming since January 1, 2000.29
The repeated awarding of punitive damages in asbestos
litigation is also forcing defendants into bankruptcy. With claims
against many defendants numbering in the thousands, punitive
damages awards can quickly drain the assets of even the healthiest
corporations. The specter of punitive damages also contributes to the
incentive to settle questionable claims.

25. See Hensler, supra note 22, at 1912-13 & n.87 (noting that individual work sites often
produced some defendants with very serious injurtes, others with milder injuries, and still others
who showed signs of asbestos exposure but remained unimpaired). A typical mass aggregation
would consolidate the claims of all of these plaintiffs for a single trial against all defendants who
could in any way be tied to asbestos products used at the plaintiffs' work site.
26. See Lester Brickman, Lawyers'Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World
of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 243, 252 (2001) (noting that
"[elven if a defendant perceives that it has a substantial likelihood of prevailing, if the number of
claims is high enough to constitute a threat to the economic viability of the company, a corporate
decision maker ... will often agree to settle the claims").
27. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 164 (discussing the "piggyback effect" that results in
overcompensation of the least injured plaintiffs by associating their claims with those of the
seriously ill).
28. See Rothstein, supranote 20, at 7.
29. Samuel Issacharoff, "Shocked'" Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1931 (2002) (noting that at least fifty-five publicly
traded companies have declared bankruptcy as a result of mounting asbestos liability, and that
the list of companies to do so since January 1, 2000, includes such notables as Babcock & Wilcox,
Federal Mogul, G-1 Holdings, Harbison Walker, Owens Corning Fibreboard, U.S. Gypsum, and
W.R. Grace); Lawyers for Asbestos Reform, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at A20, 2002 WL-WSJ
3406228.
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The problems discussed above are particularly disconcerting
when they ensnare corporations that never manufactured asbestos,
but instead merely incorporated asbestos into their products or
acquired a subsidiary with ties to the industry. The continued
extension of liability to these peripheral defendants and corporate
successors is another cause for concern. As more and more asbestos
manufacturers and their insurers have been driven into bankruptcy,
plaintiffs and their attorneys have begun to cast their nets wider,
30
drawing in defendants with increasingly tenuous ties to asbestos.
Many judges, perhaps sympathetic to the plight of plaintiffs whose
injuries may had only developed after the truly responsible companies
have been sued into oblivion, have played along. At least half of the
current claims name defendants whose connections to asbestos are
remote at best, and who almost certainly were not the cause of the
injuries for which they now face mounting liability. 31 In fact, current
studies indicate that as much as eighty-five percent of United States
industry may soon face some degree of asbestos liability.3 2 Given the
tendency for asbestos liability to bankrupt even financially stable
defendants, such numbers are certainly cause for alarm.
Finally, the inconsistent treatment of asbestos cases by the
federal and state courts encourages forum shopping and severely
hampers any attempts at grassroots reform. Over the last decade,
several commentators have urged trial judges to take the lead in
addressing the problems of asbestos litigation. 33 However, as long as

30. See Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1931-32 ("Because there are virtually no first-line
asbestos manufacturers (and few of their insurers) left standing, asbestos litigation has moved
on to find new, solvent defendants whose connection to asbestos, or the likelihood of being the
causal agent for asbestos harms, becomes increasingly attenuated over time."); see also STEPHEN
J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT
41, 47-50 (2002). In the early 1980s, the typical asbestos claimant named twenty defendants.
Id. at 41. By the mid-1990s, the same typical claimant listed sixty to seventy defendants. Id.
Asbestos litigation now directly impacts almost every sector of the United States economy, with a
growing proportion of claims being filed against nontraditional defendants. Id. at 49-50.
31. See Lawyers for Asbestos Reform, supra note 29 (noting that the list of companies
named as defendants in pending asbestos suits includes virtually "[tihe entire auto industry" as
well as companies such as Sears, Gerber and Dow Jones).
32. Id.; see also supra note 30.
33. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Barry M. Parsons, Responsible Public Policy Demands an
End to the HemorrhagingEffect of Punitive Damages in Asbestos Cases, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
137, 153-57 (2001) (arguing that courts should implement various procedures to effectively
eliminate punitive damages awards in asbestos litigation); Rothstein, supra note 20, at 30-33
(providing a laundry list of suggestions for courts to use in attempting to address the asbestos
crisis). See generally Mark A. Behrens & Monica G. Parham, Stewardship for the Sick:
PreservingAssets for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1 (2001) (urging courts to implement inactive docket programs that would postpone trials for
claims by unimpaired asbestos plaintiffs); Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral
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judges in one jurisdiction know that judges in another will hold
defendants liable in a given case, there is no incentive for any judge to
deny recovery. In fact, there is actually a disincentive, as most judges
will not want plaintiffs in their own jurisdiction to go uncompensated
while plaintiffs elsewhere are receiving payment. 34 The fact that
favorable treatment of asbestos claims by a small number of judges
can derail any attempted grassroots reform ultimately makes 35it
necessary that any proposed changes be applicable on a global scale.
Taken in concert, these problems paint a bleak picture of the
current state of asbestos litigation, particularly for seriously ill
plaintiffs and for those on the rapidly expanding list of asbestos
defendants. These problems also sound an ominous warning for
future asbestos plaintiffs. Unless some sort of serious reform occurs
quickly, even the most creative plaintiffs' attorneys will eventually
have difficulty finding solvent defendants that can be linked to
asbestos. The ultimate result will be that, in addition to many current
plaintiffs not receiving compensation commensurate with their
injuries, many, if not all, future claimants will go entirely
uncompensated. It is this concern, combined with the ever-increasing
number of companies coming into the crosshairs of asbestos plaintiffs
and their attorneys, which makes reform imperative.
Part II of this Note offers a more detailed discussion of the
problems currently plaguing asbestos litigation. Part III will discuss
various prior asbestos reform proposals. It will note the merits of
several of these schemes, some of which have been integrated into this
Note's proposal, and will also seek to identify the critical shortcomings
Part IV presents a new
that prevented their implementation.
proposal for addressing the asbestos crisis with a federal tort reform
statute. It argues that Congress could "fix" the current asbestos
litigation process by passing a targeted statute specifically addressing
only some of the major problems.
One of the most important, and perhaps the most controversial,
aspects of this proposed legislation is the extension of federal subject
matter jurisdiction to cover the vast majority of asbestos claims. A
second vital element is a limit on repeated punitive damage awards
Third, this Note calls on
against a single asbestos defendant.
Congress to mandate the implementation of a nationwide inactive
docket program that will defer the claims of unimpaired plaintiffs and
reduce the number of asbestos cases currently choking the dockets of
Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541 (1992) (advocating deferral
registries similar to the inactive docket programs proposed by Behrens and Parham).
34. See Rothstein, supra note 20, at 29.
35. Id. at 28-30.
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the nation's courts. Fourth, the proposed legislation addresses the
problems of successor liability and peripheral defendants by
implementing a statutory cap on the damages that can be awarded
against a corporate successor and exhorting judges to require
legitimate proof of actual causation in order to award damages against
any asbestos defendant.
Noticeably absent from this proposed legislation is any reform
specifically directed towards the problem of mass consolidations. This
Note concedes that some degree of consolidation is inevitable in
asbestos litigation. Part IV argues, however, that the preceding
proposals would minimize the serious detrimental effects of mass
consolidations, thus solving the problem without specifically
addressing it. In addition to these specific proposals, Part IV will
respond to several criticisms likely to be leveled at this Note's
proposed tort reform plan.
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ASBESTOS CRISIS

A. Defendant Bankruptcies36
Perhaps the most alarming trend in asbestos litigation is the
recent increase in the number of defendants seeking bankruptcy
protection. 37 At least fifty.five publicly traded companies have now
38
filed for bankruptcy citing asbestos liability as a significant cause.
More of these filings have occurred since 1998 than in the previous

36. This section should not be read as a plea for sympathy for all asbestos defendants.
Many of the early, legitimate defendants knowingly produced an extremely dangerous product,
and some even engaged in attempts to cover up its harmful effects. See generally David
Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1986). These defendants have been subjected to massive liability, and
rightly so. However, as the following paragraphs illustrate, all asbestos bankruptcies-even
those of truly culpable defendants--contribute to a wide array of undesirable developments.
37. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., SEBAGO ASSOcS., THE IMPACT OF ASBESTOS
LIABILITIES ON WORKERS IN BANKRUPT FIRMS (2002) (providing a detailed analysis of asbestos
related bankruptcies and their detrimental effects on various interested parties).
38. Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1925-26, 1931. Professor Issacharoff notes that the
number of bankruptcy filings has increased since the Supreme Court handed down its decisions
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815 (1999), two decisions rejecting the use of class action settlements as a device for
resolving asbestos claims. Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1931. He hypothesizes that the filings
will further accelerate as asbestos defendants acclimate themselves to the prepackaged
bankruptcy provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), which Congress made available after the Amchem
and Ortiz decisions. Id.; see also STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37, at 13 (estimating that the
number of publicly traded companies that have filed has risen above sixty).
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twenty years combined. 39 The list of companies that have filed since
January 1, 2000 includes such notable names as Armstrong World
Industries, Babcock & Wilcox, G-1 Holdings, Harbison Walker, Kaiser
Aluminum, Owens Corning Fibreboard, U.S. Gypsum and W.R.
Grace. 40
Other noteworthy companies facing mounting asbestos
liability include Disney, Dow Chemical, Dow Jones, Daimler Chrysler,
Ford, Gerber, IBM, Sears, and Viacom. 41 The fact that many of these
42
corporations have minimal ties to asbestos is particularly disturbing.
This list illustrates the size and variety of corporations that have
already been or could ultimately be forced into bankruptcy due to
asbestos liability.
Bankruptcy filings by asbestos defendants are alarming
because of their adverse effects on so many disparate groups. 43 The
employees and shareholders of defendant corporations are the most
obvious victims of bankruptcies, as the filings cause jobs to disappear
and stock prices to plummet. 44 Although it is certainly likely that
many of these displaced employees will find work elsewhere, even
temporary unemployment can result in substantial financial hardship.
In addition, "displaced workers tend to earn lower wages at their new
jobs, reflecting the loss of human capital associated with the
displacement." 45 Stockholders of companies driven into bankruptcy
also suffer substantial losses. 46 Financial losses caused by declining
stock values are obviously bad for all shareholders, but they can be
especially calamitous when they impact the pension or retirement
funds of the same workers who were displaced because of the
47
bankruptcy.
39. STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37, at 10-11 (Thirty-five companies have filed since 1998;
twenty-six filed in the two preceding decades.).
40. Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1931; see also Berenson, supra note 21.
41. Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1931; Lawyers for Asbestos Reform, supra note 29.
42. See discussion infra Part II.E.
43. See generally STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37.
44. See id. at 24-27. It is estimated that as many as 60,000 jobs have been lost as a result
of asbestos-related bankruptcies. Id. Stiglitz and company arrived at this figure by examining
the time series employment data for thirty-one firms that declared bankruptcy prior to
September 2002. Id. They compared the change in employment levels in each firm in the five
years prior to bankruptcy to the change in employment in other firms with the same Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Id.
45. Id. at 29 (noting that the wages at the new job are generally five to ten percent less than
at the old job).
46. See id. at 31-39; see also Lester Brickman, The Great Asbestos Swindle, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 6, 2003, at A18 (noting that asbestos litigation "has already cost investors and employees
with 401(k) plans more than the Enron debacle"), 2003 WL-WSJ 3955728.
47. A recent survey of several bankrupt companies revealed that the companies' common
stock comprised an average of twenty-five percent of their pension plan assets five years prior to
the bankruptcy. STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37, at 32-33. During the years leading up to the
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In addition to harming often innocent corporate employees and
shareholders, bankruptcy filings by asbestos defendants adversely
impact asbestos plaintiffs. Both current and recent plaintiffs suffer,
as their compensation is often greatly reduced and delayed. 48 When a
company files for bankruptcy, litigation against it is stayed and claims
cease being paid pending reorganization. 49 The average length of time
from the filing of a bankruptcy petition until its confirmation is six
years. 50 This six-year period does not accurately reflect the time that
it takes for a bankrupt defendant to begin paying claims, however.
After the defendant goes through bankruptcy reorganization, its
assets are used to establish a trust to pay asbestos claimants.
Establishing such a trust can take several additional years after the
confirmation of the reorganization plan.5 1
When the trust is
organized, each type of injury suffered by a claimant is assigned a
specific dollar amount-its "full liquidated value." 52 However, due to
the trust's limited assets and the need to pay as many claims as
possible, only a fraction of each claim's full liquidated value will
actually be paid. 53 The end result is that a plaintiff who presently
files a claim against a defendant that subsequently declares
bankruptcy is unlikely to receive any compensation for several years,
and even then will receive only pennies on the dollar.
Future plaintiffs are perhaps the biggest losers of all, as each
bankruptcy filing by an asbestos defendant or its insurer reduces the
pool of assets from which they can seek compensation. Although the

companies' filings, this common stock lost ninety-six percent of its value. Id. The result was
that many company employees, in addition to losing their jobs, lost twenty-five percent of their
retirement savings. Id.
This precipitous decline in stock values affected more than just the employees of the
bankrupt corporations, of course. Stiglitz cites the examples of the California Public Employees
Retirement System (CALPERS), which is the eighth largest institutional investor in W.R. Grace,
and the New York State Teachers Retirement Board, which was the twelfth largest institutional
investor in the USG Corporation. Id. at 37-39.
48. See STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37, at 10 ("Since bankruptcy reorganization can often
take more than five years, bankrupt firms often receive a relatively lengthy reprieve from paying
asbestos liabilities. Moreover, as part of the reorganization plan, the bankrupt firm usually wins
the right to pay claimants on much less favorable terms.").
49. See id.
50. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 68.
51. See id. at 68 (citing the example of the Amatex Trust, which did not begin making
payments to claimants until 14 years after the original bankruptcy petition was filed).
52. Id. at 67.
53. Id. at 67-68, 79-80.
The most famous asbestos trust, the Manville Trust, was
established in 1988 with instructions to pay one-hundred percent of the full liquidated value of
all claims. Id. at 79-80. Within three years, it had decreased its payments to ten percent of each
claim's full liquidated value. Id. at 80. In 2001, in response to a deluge of unanticipated new
claim filings, that figure was further reduced to five percent. Id.
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trusts are required to account for and compensate future plaintiffs,
the trusts' rates of payment are subject to reduction, and their assets
are finite.
If asbestos defendants continue to be driven into
bankruptcy at the current rate, it seems quite possible that many
54
future defendants will be lucky to receive any compensation at all.
Finally, each asbestos-related bankruptcy is harmful to every
other company that can be remotely tied to asbestos. Whenever
money is "taken off the table" in the form of a defendant bankruptcy,
the burden on nonbankrupt defendants increases, as plaintiffs who
55
still expect to be fully compensated insist that they pick up the slack.
This expectation is supported by the application of joint and several
liability to asbestos defendants-if only one of sixty defendants named
in a plaintiffs suit remains solvent, that defendant can be held liable
for one-hundred percent of the plaintiffs injuries, regardless of its
relative culpability. 56 In addition to increasing their demands on the
rapidly shrinking number of solvent traditional asbestos defendants,
plaintiffs also begin to cast their nets wider, bringing in less culpable
defendants in the hopes of finding someone to compensate them for
their injuries. 57 These attempts to expand the defendant pool are
evidenced by the fact that the number of defendants named by a
58
typical plaintiff has more than tripled over the last twenty years.
These trends combine to generate a chain reaction where each
defendant bankruptcy both increases the strain on the other

54. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in Helping Sick
Claimants and Solving Serious Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 338
(2002); Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 1-7; Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Comm. on Asbestos
Litigation, Report to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Mar.
[hereinafter AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT]; Rothstein, supra note 20, at 2, 7-14.

15,

1991, at 3

See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 68.
56. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 157. Parloff notes that in the case of James Curry, see
supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text, AC&S, one of only two solvent defendants named in
the suit, was apportioned sixty percent of the damages despite the fact that it had never had
offices in the states where the plaintiff worked, had never performed contracts at any site where
the plaintiff worked, and had "sold few asbestos-containing products anywhere." Id.
55.

57.

See, e.g., PRUDENTIAL

FINANCIAL, ASBESTOS LITIGATION-A PROBLEM WITHOUT A

SOLUTION (2002), quoted in STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37 at 18 ("Defendants are increasingly
'peripheral.' This generally means that: They did not manufacture, sell, or install asbestoscontaining insulation or materials; Asbestos was more or less 'incidental' in their products or
facilities; if it was in their products, it was enclosed [and] therefore, only a minimal number of
fibers were released into the air." (quoted in STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37, at 18)); Behrens,
supra note 54, at 339-40 (noting that the typical response of the plaintiffs' bar to bankruptcy
filings by the traditional defendants is to "cast its litigation net wider and bring in 'peripheral
defendants.' "); supra note 56; see discussion infra Part II.E.
58. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 41.
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defendants and drags more companies into the mire, thus ultimately
leading to still more bankruptcies and perpetuating the cycle. 59
The far-reaching negative impact of asbestos-related
bankruptcies illustrates why the recent increase in the number of
defendants seeking bankruptcy protection is so disturbing. Although
there is no way to turn back the clock and save the scores of
companies that have already been driven into bankruptcy as a result
of asbestos litigation, it is vital to the interests of all concerned that
steps be taken to stem the tide of bankruptcy filings among the
remaining asbestos defendants.
B. UnimpairedPlaintiffs
One of the most important driving factors behind the recent
increase in bankruptcy filings by asbestos defendants, and
correspondingly one of the most serious problems with the current
asbestos litigation process, is the precipitous surge in new claim
filings.6 0 This surge is not fueled by an increase in asbestos exposure
or a sizeable increase in the number of asbestos-related diseases.
Asbestos exposure has decreased dramatically since the passage of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in 1970,61 and although
the occurrence of asbestos-related diseases has increased slightly, this
increase does not begin to account for the number of new claims
filed.6 2 Instead, the driving force behind this surge is a drastic
59. See Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-billion Dollar Crisis,
30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 392 (1993) ("Bankruptcies among asbestos defendants, together with
the doctrine of joint and several liability, mean mounting and cumulative financial pressure on
the remaining defendants, whose resources are limited.").
60. See, e.g., CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 42 (tracking the experience of five major
asbestos defendants, four of which saw the number of claims filed against them increase from
15,000 to 20,000 claims per year in the early 1990s to approximately 50,000 claims per year by
the year 2000); STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37, at 7; Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 3;
Warren, supra note 1, at Al (noting that asbestos claim filings doubled in the year 2000 alone,
then increased by another fifty-four percent in 2001).
61. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 13-14 (also describing how EPA regulations passed in
1989 have banned certain asbestos-containing products and prohibited any new uses of
asbestos); see also James Alleman & Brooke Mossman, Asbestos Revisited, SCI. AM., July 1997, at
70-75, cited in CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 13 (noting that asbestos consumption in the
United States peaked in 1973, then declined rapidly); Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 4
("The substantial increase in the number of new asbestos claims does not correlate with either
an increase in the number of individuals exposed to products containing asbestos, or with an
increased prevalence in asbestos related diseases.').
62. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 44-45. The number of mesothelioma claims grew
throughout the 1990s at a rate of less than five percent per year, and the absolute number of
mesothelioma claims is miniscule when compared with the number of nonmalignant claims. Id.
at 44. In addition, claims filed for cancers other than mesothelioma actually decreased in the
second half of the 1990s. Id. at 44-45; see also Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 5;
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increase in filings by unimpaired plaintiffs-"'people who have been
exposed to asbestos, and who (usually) have some marker of exposure
such as changes in the pleural membrane covering the lungs, but who
are not impaired by an asbestos-related disease and likely never will
be.' ",63 Claims by these unimpaired claimants now comprise up to
64
ninety percent of the new asbestos filings occurring nationwide.
The original rationale for filings by unimpaired plaintiffs was
largely innocent. Many people who were exposed to asbestos in the
workplace subsequently learned that their lungs exhibited pleural
plaques or other hallmarks of asbestos exposure. 65 Many of these
people were not seriously ill, and felt no detrimental effects from their
asbestos exposure. 66 Unfortunately, due to the long latency period of
asbestos-related diseases, they had no way of knowing if they would
eventually develop a serious disease. 67 After learning that they
displayed physical signs of asbestos exposure, they feared their claims
would be barred by statutes of limitations if they chose to wait until
they developed cancer or became impaired in some other way before
filing.68 However, because their exposure to asbestos had not yet
caused any real injury, any claim they filed would be of questionable
merit and value. And, because most jurisdictions imposed a one injury
rule, plaintiffs who later developed a serious asbestos-related disease
would not be able to file a second claim seeking greater
compensation. 69 Faced with the choice of possibly receiving insufficient
compensation now or no compensation at all later, many plaintiffs
began to file their claims as soon as they learned that they showed
physical signs of exposure, regardless of whether they suffered any
impairment.
Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1932-33 (stating that data from the Manville Trust reveals a
"steady flow" of filings for malignancies over the course of the 1990s).
63. Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 5 (quoting Fairnessin Asbestos CompensationAct
of 1999: Hearing Before the House Comm. On H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (testimony of
Christopher Edley, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Edley Statement]).
64. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 20 (citing various studies estimating the
percentage of unimpaired claimants at anywhere from two-thirds to 90 percent of all current
claimants); see also Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 5 (citing a study estimating the figure
at eighty percent); Lawyers for Asbestos Reform, supra note 29 (estimating the figure at ninety
percent).
65. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 22; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for IncreasedRisk, Mental Distress, and
Medical Monitoring,53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 819-20 (2002).
66. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 22.
67. See id.; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 65, at 819-20.
68. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 22 (noting that most jurisdictions require a victim
to file within a short period of time after learning of pleural plaques or else risk losing out on
compensation altogether).
69. Id. at 23.
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While the strictures imposed by statutes of limitations and the
one injury rule made it reasonable for unimpaired plaintiffs to file
their claims immediately, they still faced one problem: in tort law,
there can be no recovery without injury. Understanding the difficult
situation of unimpaired plaintiffs who showed physical signs of
exposure, and wanting to ensure that all those who were harmed by
exposure to asbestos received some opportunity to be compensated,
many judges began searching for reasons to allow the unimpaired
plaintiffs' claims to go forward. 70
The most common means of
accomplishing this goal was by simply relaxing the injury
requirement, allowing it to be satisfied even by "internal changes in a
plaintiff that in some cases can only be seen on an x-ray and may
never impair the claimant's health." 71 This relaxed standard allowed
unimpaired plaintiffs to proceed with their claims in exactly the same
manner as those suffering from mesothelioma, asbestosis, or any other
physically disabling disease caused by asbestos exposure. Some courts
also sought to help the unimpaired plaintiffs by recognizing a new
cause of action for medical monitoring. 72 Although this cause of action
was squarely rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Metro
North Commuter Railroad Company v. Buckley, 73 it is still recognized
in a minority of states as a viable way for unimpaired asbestos
74
plaintiffs to bring their claims.
While the innovations of the relaxed injury requirement and
the medical monitoring cause of action allowed many unimpaired

70. See John A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990,
1011 (1985) ("[Plerhaps anticipating the impact of statutes of limitations and the single
judgment rule on [asbestos] claims should harm materialize in the future, or perhaps bewitched
by the idea of recovery for the mere fear of future illness, courts left the gate open and the
caseloads surged."), quoted in Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 6 n.31.
71. Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended Consequences in
Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline the Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 MISs.
L.J. 531, 539 (2001).
72. Id. at 540-41. This cause of action allowed a healthy plaintiff who had been exposed to
asbestos to recover the cost of medical surveillance aimed at providing an early diagnosis of any
health problems that might eventually develop. See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note
65 (providing a scathing condemnation of the practice of awarding damages for medical
monitoring, increased risk, or fear of illness in asbestos litigation).
73. 521 U.S. 424, 427 (1997), discussed in Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 71, at 540-41.
Essentially, the Court concluded that the sheer volume of potential medical monitoring claims
would lead to expenditures that would cripple asbestos defendants and siphon off resources
needed to compensate those who were truly injured. Id.
74. See Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 71, at 541. The Metro-North decision was rendered
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), a federal worker's compensation statute.
521 U.S. at 426-27. State courts therefore remain free to recognize medical monitoring claims,
although most have followed the Supreme Court in rejecting them. Schwartz & Tedesco, supra
note 71, at 541.
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plaintiffs to file their claims before they became barred by statutes of
limitations, they did little to alleviate the effects of the one injury rule.
An unimpaired individual with pleural plaques or other physical
evidence of asbestos exposure could file a claim and either settle or get
to trial. However, the compensation this individual received for his
current injury might be insufficient if he should later develop a more
severe disease, and the one injury rule would prevent him from
bringing another action seeking more compensation. In an effort to
ensure that those injured by asbestos were adequately compensated,
courts again responded.
Their answer to this dilemma was to
abandon the one injury rule, thereby recognizing a second, separate
75
cause of action when a serious asbestos-related disease developed.
With these concessions from the courts, unimpaired plaintiffs had
every incentive to file their claims as soon as they discovered any
physical evidence of asbestos exposure.
What ostensibly started as a good faith attempt by judges and
plaintiffs to ensure that culpable asbestos defendants could not avoid
liability by hiding behind statutes of limitations has mushroomed into
one of the most significant elements of the current asbestos crisis.
Court dockets are now choked with huge numbers of claims filed by
unimpaired plaintiffs.7 6 These claims cause delays for plaintiffs with
extremely serious, often fatal injuries, as they are forced to wait in
line while unimpaired plaintiffs who filed before them have their day
in court. 77 In addition, funds given to unimpaired plaintiffs as a result
of jury awards or settlements deplete the pool of assets available to
compensate the seriously ill; indeed, awards to unimpaired defendants
are the driving force behind many defendant bankruptcies. These are
just some of the most serious costs of the judicial maneuvering that
has allowed courts to hear "claims that are premature (because there
is not yet any impairment) or actually meritless (because there never
78
will be)."

75. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 65, at 821 n.22 (providing an extensive list of
decisions from various jurisdictions in which courts allowed a second claim by a previously
compensated plaintiff who had developed a serious asbestos-related disease since his first claim).
76. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
77. For a general criticism of the "first in, first out" (FIFO) treatment of asbestos plaintiffs
regardless of their level of injury or potentially reduced life expectancy, see Schuck, supra note
33, at 560-68.
78.

Id. at 555.
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C. Mass Consolidation
The detrimental effects of claims brought by unimpaired
claimants are exacerbated by the mass consolidation of claims for
trial, a common practice in many courts that are forced to deal with a
high volume of asbestos litigation. Again, the original impetus behind
the decision to use mass consolidations in asbestos litigation was
largely innocent. Judges who were overwhelmed with asbestos claims
sought some way to allow each plaintiff to have his or her day in court,
but quickly realized that the sheer volume of claims being filed would
prevent them from ever being heard individually. 9 Their solution was
to join several claims that had common issues into a single trial in an
effort to resolve them efficiently.8 0 Typically, a mass consolidation
featured a mini-trial (known as a "bouquet trial") for a small group of
representative plaintiffs selected by the judge. 8 ' The hope was that
the results of this bouquet trial could then be extrapolated to the
entire group of plaintiffs, thereby facilitating settlement.
Initially, consolidations seemed like an easy way to dispose of
dozens of asbestos claims quickly, efficiently, and fairly. Early on,
judges allowed only "small scale consolidations in which there were
'very similar liability issues ... [and] careful attention [was paid] to
82
the precise claims raised by each plaintiff against each defendant."'
The procedure quickly became problematic, however, as early
successes encouraged judges to become increasingly reliant upon it.83
As mass consolidations grew larger and more prevalent, they began to
create new problems, thus adding fuel to the very fire they were
meant to help extinguish.

79. The Honorable Conrad L. Mallett, Jr., former Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme
Court, made the following observation: 'Think about a county circuit judge who has dropped on
her 5,000 [asbestos] cases all at the same time.... [If she scheduled all 5,000 cases for one week
trials, she would not complete her task until the year 2095. The judge's first thought then is
'How do I handle these cases quickly and efficiently?' The judge does not purposely ignore
fairness and truth, but the demands of the system require speed and dictate case consolidation..
. ." Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary on H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. 155 (1999) (statement of the Hon. Conrad L. Mallett, Jr.),
quoted in Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 249-50.
80. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 249-50, 256-57.
81. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 164.
82. Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 71, at 542-43 (quoting Fairness in Asbestos
Compensation Act of 1999: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 1283,
106th Cong. 91 (1999) (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr., Professor, Yale Law School)).
83. See id. at 543; Parloff, supra note 2, at 162 ("Within just two years after one federal
appeals court in 1985 very cautiously okayed the joinder of four plaintiffs into one caseexplaining that all four had served on the same work crew and that two were brothers-a federal
trial judge consolidated 3,031 plaintiffs into a single case in Beaumont, Tex.").

2003]

MAKES SENSE TO ME

1965

Many problems have been created by mass consolidations. The
first and most ironic is that, instead of helping judges to clear their
dockets of asbestos cases, mass consolidations have actually
encouraged more claim filings. As Professor McGovern explained,
judges who succeed in moving "large numbers of highly elastic mass
torts through their litigation process at low transaction costs create
the opportunity for new filings. They increase the demand for new
cases by their high resolution rates and low transaction costs. If you
build a superhighway, there will be a traffic jam."8 4 As more and more
cases moved through the courts with relative ease, a sort of vacuum
was created. In response, plaintiffs' attorneys, already eager to bring
more cases, stepped up recruiting efforts to locate new prospective
claimants.8 5 Ultimately, mass consolidations encouraged more new
claims than they disposed of, and therefore only added to the problem
they were supposed to correct.
In addition to encouraging the filing of what are likely to be
more questionable claims, mass consolidations create a significant risk
of jury confusion and prejudice if and when those claims go to trial.
Recent consolidations in asbestos hotbeds such as West Virginia,
Texas, and Mississippi have seen claims by as many as 11,000
plaintiffs against up to two-hundred and fifty defendants consolidated
for trial before a single jury.8 6 Typically the plaintiffs' injuries run the
gamut, ranging from mesothelioma and other cancers to asbestosis to

84. Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 606 (1997), quoted in Rothstein, supranote 20, at 9 and Schwartz and Lorber,
supra note 24, at 250; see also Parloff, supra note 2, at 164 ("You think you're clearing your
docket, but what you're doing is you're widening the pipeline to the courthouse." (quoting David
Bernick, a litigator who represents three bankrupt asbestos defendants)).
85. See, e.g., Parloff, supra note 2, at 158 (describing the mass screenings engaged in by
plaintiffs' attorneys in search of new clients). Beginning in the mid-1980s, around the same time
as mass consolidations, plaintiffs' attorneys began working in concert with labor unions to
uncover new asbestos claimants. Id. Typically, attorneys would send an "examobile," a van
containing radiographic equipment, to a worksite. Id. Workers over a certain age (those most
likely to have suffered asbestos exposure before it was strictly regulated in the early 1970s) were
invited to visit the van for a free chest X-ray, conditioned upon their signing a retainer
agreement to be represented by the firm sponsoring the examobile if the X-ray should reveal any
asbestos-related disease. Id. After the X-rays were collected, the plaintiffs' attorney would hire
a specialist to "sift through them, assembly-line style, looking for arguable cases of asbestos,
pleural plaques, or cancer." Id.; see also Brickman, supra note 23, at 1854 n.144 (citing cases
involving mass screenings through trucks brought to work sites, and quoting an Ohio newspaper
advertisement seeking potential plaintiffs); Brickman, supra note 26, at 272-84 (discussing the
claimant recruitment process, beginning with the employment of a union intermediary and
continuing through the administration of a "script memo" telling the claimant how to testify at a
deposition).
86. Lawyers for Asbestos Reform, supra note 29; Parloff, supra note 2, at 162, 164.
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no impairment whatsoever.8 7 Common sense dictates that the levels
of culpability are bound to vary widely when a case involves literally
hundreds of defendants. The inevitable effects of asking a jury that
has heard evidence pertaining to such disparate levels of injury and
culpability to properly differentiate the claims were noted by United
States District Court Judge Charles Butler. When granting the
defendants' motion for a new trial in a case involving thirteen
consolidated asbestos claims, he lamented that, despite his best efforts
at precautionary measures, the joint trial of "such a large number of
differing cases both confused and prejudiced the jury."8 8 Supporting
his conclusion that the jury was confused and prejudiced, Judge
Butler noted that identical damages were awarded to plaintiffs with
and without cancer, and that the damage awards were "inflated" and
often not supported by the evidence.8 9 If the consolidation of thirteen
claims for trial produced the prejudicial effect noted by Judge Butler,
one can only imagine how that effect is magnified in trials featuring
thousands of asbestos claims.
The tendency of mass consolidations to prejudice and confuse
the jury often deprives defendants of a fair trial in another way: by
forcing them to settle out of court. 90 Joining thousands of claims for a
single trial essentially forces a defendant to settle as a refusal to do so
creates what has been termed a "bet-the-company risk."9 1 As
Professor Brickman explains:

87. See, e.g., Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 256-57 & n.37 (citing a number of mass
consolidations and listing the myriad injuries of the plaintiffs). Schwartz and Lorber also
comment on the peculiarity of allowing such disparate claims to be consolidated for trial, noting
that judges have "unanimously rejected such consolidation even for purposes of discovery and
pre-trial handling' in the repetitive stress injury arena. Id. at 256-57. This rejection is
supported on the grounds that, while all of the plaintiffs' claims could be properly characterized
as repetitive stress injuries, they were nevertheless distinct injuries. Id. at 257. Schwartz and
Lorber conclude that "[j]udges adhered to the rule of law in repetitive stress injury cases. They
should in asbestos cases as well." Id. at 257 & nn.38-39.
88. Cain v. Armstrong World Indus., 785 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (S.D. Ala. 1992), quoted in
Brickman, supranote 23, at 1876 (emphasis added).
89. Brickman, supra note 23, at 1876 ("This confusion and prejudice is manifest in the
identical damages awarded in the noncancer personal injury cases and in the cancer personal
injury cases, the relatively short deliberation time as well as in the inflated amount of many of
the damage awards and the lack of evidence supporting some of the damages in several cases.").
90. Of course, there is nothing inherently objectionable about settling a case out of court,
even on a massive scale. This is often the preferred result of litigation for all parties. The
problem arises when unimpaired plaintiffs are able to "piggy back" their claims on those of the
legitimately injured, thereby extorting a settlement figure that bears no cognizable relationship
to the substantive merits of the unimpaired plaintiffs' claims. See infra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text.
91. Edley Statement, supra note 63, at 33, quoted in Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 71, at
544; Brickman, supranote 26, at 253.
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Even if a defendant perceives that it has a substantial likelihood of prevailing, if the
number of claims is high enough to constitute a threat to the economic viability of the
company, a corporate decision maker, motivated by the short-term consideration of fear
of losing the company on his or her watch, will often agree to settle the claims even if
the long-term interests of the corporation are to litigate the claims fully. This is so
because the aggregated claims ... potentially
exceed the combined assets of the
92
corporations and any available insurance.

By forcing a defendant to choose between settling all pending
claims-including those of dubious merit-and facing a potentially
bankrupting verdict at the hands of a prejudiced jury, mass
consolidations effectively deprive asbestos defendants of their right to
a trial. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that some
judges intentionally abuse the consolidation process in an effort to
93
force defendants to settle claims out of court.
In addition to further clogging court dockets and limiting the
due process rights of defendants, mass consolidations have produced
another unanticipated side effect: driving up the value of claims by
unimpaired plaintiffs. As common sense would suggest (and Judge
Butler observed), 94 bouquet trials result in overcompensation of
unimpaired plaintiffs by allowing them to benefit from sympathy by
association. 95 Likewise, in settlement negotiations, the unimpaired

92. Brickman, supra note 26, at 252-53; see also Faulk, supra note 20, at 660 ("One
questionable claim can be tried, but a thousand questionable joined-together claims present a
gigantic risk, and many defendants would rather settle questionable claims than face that
risk.").
93. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 164. Parloff describes a graphic example of such abuse
occurring in the Jefferson County, Mississippi case of Cosey v. E.D. Bullard Co., Civ. No. 95-0069
(Miss. Cir. Ct., Jefferson County, June 12, 1998). In a consolidation of 1,700 plaintiffs, the jury
returned a verdict of $48.5 million in the bouquet trial of twelve individuals (including $2 million
each for five unimpaired claimants). Parloff, supra note 2, at 166. While the same jury
deliberated as to whether to impose additional punitive damages, most defendants settled. Id. at
168. The judge, Lamar Pickard, then personally telephoned the representatives of each of the
nonsettling defendants, giving them thirty days to settle the claims of all 1,700 plaintiffs. Id. If
they did not do so, he threatened to reconvene the same jury to set damages for all the plaintiffs.
Id. He added that they could not appeal this decision, as Mississippi law required an the posting
of an appeal bond in the amount of one-hundred and twenty-five percent of the total judgment.
Id. After the Mississippi Supreme Court refused an emergency petition to remove Judge Pickard
for bias, the defendants were forced to settle all 1,700 plaintiffs' claims. Id. Stories such as this
one likely explain why Jefferson County, Mississippi, has more asbestos plaintiffs than residents.
See supra note 22; see also Behrens, supra note 54, at 350-52. Behrens comments on the Cosey
case and also notes that in 1999 the West Virginia Supreme Court established a Mass Litigation
Panel and instructed it to use mass trials to resolve more than 25,000 pending asbestos claims in
the state by July of 2002. Behrens, supra note 54, at 351. This prompted a federal lawsuit by
several defendants alleging violation of their due process rights because they were effectively
prevented from interviewing all of the plaintiffs or having them submit to medical examinations.
Id. (citing Michelle Saxton, Railroads File Lawsuit Against W. Va. Supreme Court, ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRE Nov. 29, 2001).
94. See supranote 88 and accompanying text.
95. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 164.
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plaintiffs and their counsel are able to use the value of the impaired
plaintiffs' claims as leverage to artificially inflate the value of their
own claims. 96 In addition to providing an undeserved windfall for
unimpaired plaintiffs, this increased claim value harms all other
parties to asbestos litigation. Defendants and future claimants are
injured as the increased settlement or judgment values push already
weakened defendants closer to bankruptcy, thus reducing the pool of
assets available to compensate future claimants. Furthermore, current
impaired plaintiffs see their compensation decrease as funds that
should have gone to them are spread to their unimpaired co97
plaintiffs.
Finally, there is some evidence that mass consolidations
deprive plaintiffs of adequate representation. It seems self-evident
that a group of attorneys would have a difficult time adequately
representing the interests of all of their clients in a suit involving
thousands of claimants with differing backgrounds and injury levels.
This conclusion is implied by the decreased compensation that
impaired plaintiffs receive in settlements resulting from mass
consolidations, and is supported more concretely by cases in which
settlement distributions have not corresponded to the injuries
98
sustained by the plaintiffs.
In sum, mass consolidations have been a spectacular failure,
solving very few problems while creating many. Originally intended
as a way to decrease the asbestos caseload of judges, they have had
exactly the opposite effect. In addition, the procedure substantially
abridges the due process rights of defendants by prejudicing and
confusing juries and by frequently forcing settlements that preclude
jury trials altogether.
Furthermore, mass consolidations likely
prevent many plaintiffs from receiving adequate representation.
Finally, by inflating the value of claims by unimpaired plaintiffs, mass
consolidations push more defendants closer to bankruptcy, siphon off
the resources available to current and future impaired claimants, and
encourage the filing of still more claims by unimpaired plaintiffs, thus
perpetuating the cycle.
96. See Behrens, supra note 54, at 349-50; Schwartz & Tedesco, supranote 71, at 544-45.
97. Edley Statement, supra note 63 at 33 ("In the settlement.., the higher potential juryaward value of the impaired claims is spread, at least partially, to the unimpaired. The
arithmetic is straightforward: the unimpaired and the attorneys who receive contingent fees
benefit at the expense of impaired victims."); see also Behrens, supra note 54, at 349-50.
98. See Stephen Labaton, Settlement Reached in Huge Asbestos Case, But Unequal Awards
to Victims Inspire Talk of Legislation to Fix System, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 23, 2000, at
13A, cited in Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 71, at 545 (detailing a case in which the settlement
disbursements to similarly injured plaintiffs were directly proportional to their geographic
proximity to the district in which the case was filed), availableat 2000 WL 3847459.
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D. Punitive Damages
Repeated awards of punitive damages are another key element of the
asbestos litigation crisis. Almost every asbestos claim filed includes a
request for punitive damages, requests that trial juries have proven
all too willing to grant. 99 In addition to the direct cost of paying the
awards whenever they occur, the specter of being forced to pay
millions of dollars in punitive damages for each plaintiff increases the
pressure on defendants to settle, as well as the cost of doing so.loo
These tendencies make punitive damages awards, in addition to
problems associated with unimpaired
plaintiffs and mass
consolidations, integral to "speeding corporate defendants down the
path to bankruptcy." 10 1 The practical effect of punitive damage
awards is to take money out of the hands of future claimants in order
to give extra awards to current plaintiffs. 102
In addition to
jeopardizing future plaintiffs' ability to recover, the practice of
repeatedly awarding punitive damages in asbestos litigation raises
serious ethical and possibly even constitutional issues with regard to
its effect on defendants.
The two justifications commonly cited for awarding punitive
damages are deterrence and punishment. 10 3 However, in the asbestos
context, deterrence is a moot point. Asbestos use in the United States
10 4
is largely a relic of the past; there is no conduct left to deter.
Without deterrence as a goal, the only purpose punitive damages
serve is to punish defendants. This is problematic for two reasons.

99. See Behrens, supra note 54, at 352-53 (listing several large punitive damages awards
given in Texas during 2001); Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 141-43.
100. See George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L. REV.
825, 830 (1996) ("(T)he availability of unlimited punitive damages affects the 95% to 98% of cases
that settle out of court prior to trial. It is obvious and indisputable that a punitive damages
claim increases the magnitude of the ultimate settlement and, indeed, affects the entire
settlement process, increasing the likelihood of litigation."); see also Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371,
1398 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe potential for punitive awards is a weighty factor
in settlement negotiations and inevitably results in a larger settlement agreement that would
ordinarily be obtained. To the extent that this premium exceeds what would otherwise be a fair
and reasonable settlement for compensatory damages, assets that could be available for
satisfaction of future compensatory claims are dissipated."); Behrens, supra note 54, at 353
(noting "the leveraging effect punitive damages have at the settlement table").
101. Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 141.
102. In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that punitive damages are a
windfall to recipients and deplete the funds available to compensate future asbestos victims).
103. See Brickman, supra note 23, at 1862-63; Rothstein, supra note 20, at 26 ("When the
threat of large punitive damage awards is used to increase settlement amounts, punitive
damages become a means of extortion rather than the corrective and deterrent they are intended
to be.").
104. See Brickman, supra note 23, at 1863.
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First, as noted by Professor Rothstein, in addition to the fact that
twenty years of punitive damages awards almost certainly constitutes
adequate punishment under any circumstances, the passage of two
decades also means that corporations are being punished today for
decisions made by managers and other personnel whom they no longer
employ.105 The idea that asbestos defendants have simply been
punished enough highlights the ethical problem with continuing to
grant punitive damage awards in asbestos litigation. To continue
punishing defendants at this point seems unfair, and to do so when it
clearly places at risk the ability of future plaintiffs to be compensated
is perplexing.
Likewise, repeatedly subjecting defendants to punitive
damages for the same conduct, particularly after the deterrence
motive is removed, raises serious constitutional issues. Many courts
and scholars alike have objected to the practice on due process
grounds.1 0 6 While an in-depth analysis of the constitutional issues
implicated is beyond the scope of this Note, the very existence of such
issues casts further doubt on a practice that has only served to
exacerbate the problems facing defendants and future claimants in
asbestos litigation.
E. PeripheralDefendants and Successor Liability
Yet another troublesome feature
ever-expanding pool of defendants.
manufacturers and other popular early
into bankruptcy by asbestos claims,
managed to produce new defendants

of asbestos litigation is the
As the major asbestos
defendants have been forced
plaintiffs have continually
who are allegedly just as

105. Rothstein, supra note 20, at 26 ("It would be difficult to argue that punitive damages
awards in asbestos cases over the past twenty years have not adequately punished asbestos
manufacturers. Moreover, individuals responsible for decisions relating to asbestos products no
longer work at these corporations and in most cases are dead. Punishing corporations for
decisions made years before the present management was in power does not serve the purpose of
punitive damages.").
106. See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1387 (3d Cir. 1993) ("We do not disagree with the
concerns that have been expressed about punitive damages awards, particularly in the asbestos
cases. We differ instead with those who would have the judiciary resolve the conflicting policy
arguments.") (upholding a lower court's decision to award punitive damages, but decreasing the
amount awarded); Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 145-46 & nn.47-48 (citing a litany of
cases and articles where such concerns were voiced); Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive Damage
Awards, 39 VILL. L. REV. 433, 436-38 & nn.7-9 (1994) (same). Professor Phillips argues that
"(i)nsofar as a defendant feels oppressed by multiple punitive damage awards arising out of the
same course of conduct, it always has the option of bankruptcy, which is far from unattractive in
the case of corporate defendants." Phillips, supra, at 453. While his conclusion with regard to
corporate defendants is debatable, it is clear that defendant bankruptcies are an unattractive
course of conduct for current and future asbestos plaintiffs. See supra Part II.A.
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culpable. However, common sense seems to lead to the conclusion
that, were these new defendants truly culpable, they would have been
sued from the beginning along with the front line defendants.
Numerous studies and scholars confirm that most of these newer
' '10 7
defendants have, at best, "only attenuated connections to asbestos.
Examples of just how far plaintiffs have convinced juries to extend
liability would be laughable if not for their serious impact on both the
peripheral defendants themselves and the viability of future asbestos
claims. For instance, a New York jury recently compensated a
plaintiff for cancer that he claimed was caused by asbestos-containing
products that he purchased over fifty years ago.1 08 Likewise, a small,
San Francisco-based company that sells wooden doors has become a
target because, during the 1960s and 1970s, it sold wooden fire barrier
doors, made by another company, which allegedly contained
encapsulated asbestos "in [their] mineral core." 10 9 If defendants such
as these can be found liable, it should come as little surprise that
asbestos litigation now touches almost every sector of the United
States economy.11 0
While injured plaintiffs should not be faulted for "look[ing]
under every stone"1 1 in an effort to find someone with the resources to
compensate them for their injuries, the fact that most parties actually
responsible for asbestos injuries have been driven into bankruptcy
does not make these peripheral defendants any more culpable than
12
they were when the front line defendants were still solvent.
Moreover, as noted above, claims by injured plaintiffs comprise only a
small percentage of the total number of annual asbestos claims filed;
most are filed by the unimpaired." 3
Therefore, nonculpable
107. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 262; see, e.g., PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, supra note
57 ("Defendants are increasingly 'peripheral.'
This generally means that: They did not
manufacture, sell, or install asbestos-containing insulation or materials; Asbestos was more or
less 'incidental' in their products or facilities."), quoted in STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37, at 18;
Behrens, supra note 54, at 333 ("These peripheral companies only have attenuated connections
to asbestos, but they provide fresh 'deep pockets,' and that is why they have become targets of
litigation.").
108. N.Y. Jury Finds Sears/GE Liable for Exposure; Awards $1.5 Million to Meso Victim,
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Oct. 6, 2000; see also Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 263.
109. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 264. Also note the example of James Curry
discussed supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
110. See STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 37, at 49 ("At least one company in nearly every U.S.
industry [is] now involved in [asbestos] litigation.").
111. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 262 (quoting James Early, a New York plaintiffs'
attorney whose firm specializes in asbestos litigation).
112. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 166 (noting that many juries apparently fail to comprehend
this point, as plaintiffs have been remarkably successful at convincing them that "these
afterthought defendants, who never used to be sued at all, were actually the guiltiest parties").
113. See supra Part I.B.
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defendants are being driven into bankruptcy by being forced not just
to pay, but to overpay uninjured claimants. This is the paradigmatic
statement of the problems with the current asbestos litigation process.
Similar problems inhere from the continued enforcement of
successor liability in asbestos litigation. 114 As noted by Professor
Rothstein, most of the corporations responsible for manufacturing
asbestos have long since declared bankruptcy, and the present
managers and personnel of the surviving corporations had no part in
115
the decisions that ultimately exposed so many workers to asbestos.
Furthermore, most of the remaining corporations that do have any
concrete ties to asbestos acquired them only by virtue of acquisitions
of smaller companies that engaged in the manufacture or sale of
116
asbestos-related products, often on a very low level.
The doctrine of successor liability has enabled the acquisitions
of small asbestos producers by much larger, wealthier corporations to
create a windfall for asbestos plaintiffs and their attorneys. Professor
Brickman explains:
Under this doctrine, successor companies are held liable not only for acts they did not
commit, but also for the consequences of the acts of their acquired companies that they
were not aware of at the time of the acquisition and of which they could not have been
aware. In theory however, successor liability is not predicated on punishing the
acquiring company for its acquisition of a bad actor but rather on punishing the
acquired company for its11bad
acts ....
However, as applied in the asbestos context, the
7
reality belies the theory.

While the theory underlying the doctrine of successor liability may be
to punish only the acquired company, the reality, at least in the
context of asbestos litigation, has been to punish the shareholders and
employees of corporations whose only misdeed was lacking the
foresight to avoid purchasing any company with ties to asbestos.
In theory, successor liability punishes the acquired company by
causing its market value to decrease by the amount of liability that its
past acts should create.11 8 However, in asbestos litigation, courts have
cast aside the theory behind the doctrine. Instead of limiting the
successor corporation's liability to the market value of the acquired
114. The term "successor liability" refers to the practice of holding an acquiring corporate
entity liable for the pre-acquisition acts of an acquired entity. For example, assume that Chris's
Cords, a small company that produces corduroy jackets, is acquired by RosenCorp, a
multinational business conglomerate. It is subsequently discovered that, prior to its acquisition
by RosenCorp, Chris's Cords produced jackets that burst into flames when placed in direct
sunlight. The doctrine of successor liability would allow individuals injured by those jackets to
pursue tort claims against RosenCorp.
115. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
116. See Brickman, supra note 23, at 1881.
117. Id. at 1882-83.
118. See id. at 1883.
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corporation, or even to that value plus any profits generated by the
acquisition, courts have allowed successors to be subjected to limitless
liability.119
Runaway application of the successor liability doctrine is
another way in which parties bearing tenuous legal culpability and no
moral culpability are being destroyed by asbestos litigation. It often
results in considerable awards that are nothing more than an
undeserved windfall for asbestos plaintiffs. 120 While the bankruptcies
spurred on by misapplication of the doctrine arguably do not impact
the ability of future claimants to recover, they do considerably broaden
12 1
the negative impact of asbestos litigation on the economy at large.
The fact that punitive damages are often included in cases based
completely on successor liability only serves to exacerbate the
22
doctrine's detrimental effects.'
F. Inconsistent Treatment in Federal and State Courts
A final troublesome aspect of the current asbestos litigation
process is the inconsistent manner in which various state and federal
courts have responded to it.123 This disparate treatment is largely the
result of differences in procedural rules and jury tendencies in
different jurisdictions.1 24 While the state-based nature of tort law
means that courts will not deal with asbestos cases in exactly the
119. For instance, in the 1960s, Crown, Cork & Seal bought a bottle cap manufacturer for $7
million. Lawyers for Asbestos Reform, supra note 29. Three months later it sold off a small
insulation business that it had also acquired in the deal. Id. To date, that three month
ownership of the insulation business has cost Crown $350 million in asbestos claims. Id.
120. See Brickman, supra note 23, at 1882-84.
121. It cannot fairly be claimed that future plaintiffs are injured by misapplication of the
doctrine of successor liability, as they would likely remain unable to recover against corporate
successors if the doctrine were correctly applied or not applied at all.
122. See Brickman, supra note 23, at 1884 ("Simply stated punitive damage awards based
upon successor liability are unabashed windfalls.").
123. Paul Rothstein goes so far as to argue that "(t)he lack of a coordinated approach results
in compensation based on forum rather than merit." Rothstein, supra note 20, at 30.
124. Handling of punitive damages provides one particularly important example of the
divergent treatment of asbestos claims in state and federal courts. In federal courts, all asbestos
cases are transferred to MDL No. 875 (MDL Panel) for pre-trial proceedings. See In re Asbestos
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422-24 (J.P.M.L. 1991); Behrens & Parham, supra
note 33, at 15-16. The MDL Panel has decided to sever all punitive damages claims in asbestos
litigation before remanding the compensatory claims for trial. See In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809,
812 (3d Cir. 2000) (approving the MDL Panel's decision). For a detailed discussion of Collins, see
Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 149-54, 156. While a few state judges have taken a similar
approach, punitive damages awards are still very much alive and well in many states. See id. at
154-55 (noting that judges in Maryland and Pennsylvania have severed claims for punitive
damages in asbestos litigation); Behrens, supra note 54, at 352-53 (providing a list of sizeable
punitive damages awards recently handed down by juries in Texas).
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same manner, the degree of inconsistency in asbestos litigation has
two unfortunate side effects.
One problem with the inconsistent treatment afforded asbestos
litigation in various state and federal courts is that it has encouraged
wide scale forum shopping. This forum shopping is made possible by
some states' extremely liberal rules allowing claim filings by out of
state plaintiffs. 125 Two distinct trends illustrate the extent to which
forum shopping has impacted asbestos litigation. First, asbestos
filings have dramatically shifted from federal to state courts. 126 This
trend likely reflects plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with the federal MultiDistrict Litigation Panel's [MDL Panel] decision to sever claims for
punitive damages and institute other reforms in all asbestos cases
pending before federal courts. 127 Similarly, the last two decades have
seen a substantial shift in the number of asbestos claims filed in
particular states.1 28 Not surprisingly, the states that now account for
the lion's share of asbestos claim filings are those whose judges, juries,
and procedural rules are most favorable to asbestos plaintiffs.129 Easy
access to forum shopping allows asbestos plaintiffs, regardless of their
place of residence or injury, to file their claims in jurisdictions that
tend to award the highest damages. Defending more claims in these

125. For instance, Mississippi law does not recognize class actions, but it does allow for the
joinder of thousands of claimants regardless of their state of residence, provided that at least one
plaintiff is a Mississippi resident who is suing at least one out-of-state defendant. See Rothstein,
supra note 20, at 15.
126. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 29. Forty-one percent of all asbestos claims were
filed in federal court prior to 1988. Id. That figure had fallen to less than twenty percent by
1998. Id.
127. See supra note 124; discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
128. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 32. From 1970-1987, sixty percent of asbestos
claims were filed in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois. Id. From 1998 to 2000,
those states accounted for only seven percent of the total claims filed. Id. The percentage of
cases filed in Mississippi, New York, West Virginia, Ohio, and Texas rose from nine to sixty-six
over the same period. Id.
129. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 54, at 352-53 ("Plaintiffs' lawyers seek punitive damages
in virtually every asbestos case they file. It is not uncommon for them to hit the jackpot at trial,
particularly in Texas."); Rothstein, supra note 20, at 15-19 (noting Mississippi's liberal rules
regarding claim filings by out of state plaintiffs and that Mississippi and West Virginia
frequently resort to extremely large consolidations in asbestos litigation); Stephen Labaton, Top
Asbestos Makers Agree to Settle 2 Large Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at 22 ('It's no
secret that there are state courtrooms in Mississippi which have become notorious for awarding
outlandish verdicts to asbestos claimants who are not sick and as a result, asbestos cases from
all over the country tend to migrate there."'(quoting Richard Weinberg, General Counsel for GAF
Corp.)), cited in Rothstein, supra note 20, at 16; supra note 22 and accompanying text. Also note
that Pennsylvania, where asbestos claim filings have drastically decreased, is one of the states
where judges have begun to sever claims for punitive damages. See Behrens & Parsons, supra
note 33, at 155.
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jurisdictions increases the already intense financial pressures that
ultimately force many asbestos defendants into bankruptcy.
A second and related problem resulting from the inconsistent
treatment of asbestos litigation in different jurisdictions is that it
substantially impairs any attempts at grassroots reform. Reforms
implemented by one judge or jurisdiction will have little to no effect if
plaintiffs can simply file their claims elsewhere, in a jurisdiction
unwilling to implement similar measures. 130 If such reforms have any
impact whatsoever, it will only be to prevent plaintiffs who are in the
reform-minded judge's jurisdiction and for some reason cannot file
elsewhere from enjoying the same largesse as plaintiffs who are not so
restricted. 131 Judges are likely to recognize this dilemma and conclude
that, if asbestos defendants are likely to be sued into financial ruin
and future claimants are to go uncompensated regardless of the
judges' attempted reforms, then the current plaintiffs in their
jurisdiction might as well be allowed to seek the highest possible
damages.13 2 As a result, the disparate treatment of asbestos litigation
in different jurisdictions combines with the easy and extensive access
to forum shopping both to discourage any attempts at grass roots
reform and to ensure that any attempts that are undertaken will
prove ineffectual.
The inability of trial judges to implement
meaningful reforms helps to explain why the asbestos litigation crisis
has grown to its present magnitude.

130. See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1386 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[B]oth state and federal courts
have recognized that no single court can fashion an effective response to the national problem
flowing from mass exposure to asbestos products."); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d
466, 480 (N.J. 1986) ("At the state court level we are powerless to implement solutions to the
nation-wide problems created by asbestos exposure and litigation arising from that exposure."),
quoted in Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1386; see also Faulk, supra note 20, at 660 ("State legislatures have
created a patchwork quilt of legislation that is conflicting and actually impedes the efficient
settlement of asbestos cases.") (arguing that it is the responsibility of the federal government to
take steps to regulate asbestos litigation).
131. See Rothstein, supra note 20, at 28-29 ("Imagine the frustration of one judge, coping
with the impact of depleted funds and mounting bankruptcies by setting for trial only the cases
of those who are sick or have died from an asbestos disease, watching a judge in another state
allow unimpaired claimants to achieve compensation as part of a mass consolidated trial.").
132. See id. at 29 (noting that "courts are often hesitant to take a global view of the problem
at the expense of the citizens of their state"). Rothstein points to the reluctance of most courts to
prevent punitive damages awards as a prime example of such behavior. Id. ("A state otherwise
willing to impose such self-denying limits might be disinclined to do so until assured that others
would follow suit." (citing Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir.
1967))).
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PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION: WHAT HAS GONE WRONG?

Prior proposals for alleviating the asbestos crisis have taken
various forms. Although a few attempts at reform have met with
limited success, the current state of the asbestos litigation crisis is a
testament to their general ineffectiveness. The following section of
this Note attempts to discern and delineate the reasons behind the
poor track record of previous attempts at asbestos reform.
A. Attempts at an Administrative Solution
Proposals for a legislative resolution of the asbestos crisis have
generally called for an administrative compensation scheme that
would displace traditional tort law in asbestos cases. 133
Early
proposals for an administrative alternative to asbestos litigation
typically supported a no-fault regime similar to workers' compensation
or the Black Lung Act. 134 Other common features included: abolition
of punitive damages, the imposition of strict, clearly defined medical
impairment criteria, structured payments to plaintiffs based on degree
of disability, some form of administrative appeals process, and
financial support from the government as well as statutory definitions
of eligible defendants.1 35 The general goal of these proposals was to
remove asbestos litigation from the courts entirely, thereby allowing
the federal government to regulate the asbestos compensation process
to ensure that sick plaintiffs received adequate compensation without
undue prejudice to defendants.
Despite their noble intentions, no-fault administrative
compensation regimes had numerous problems. First among these
was a general congressional uncertainty about administrative
compensation regimes.' 36 This distrust was born of experience. While
133. See, e.g.,Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong.
(1999); Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A Proposal to the United
States Congress, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1891-93 (1992); Edley & Weiler, supra note 59, at
397-401 (arguing that an administrative compensation scheme would be the "ideal solution" to
the asbestos crisis). See generally Joseph P. Helm, III, Comment, Asbestos Litigation and the
Proposed AdministrativeRemedy: Between the Values of Individualism and DistributiveJustice,
50 EMORY L.J. 631 (2001) (discussing the Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999).
134. See Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos Litigation, SH043 ALI-ABA 119, 126 (2002) ("The
asbestos bills of the 1980s sought to replace the tort system with an administrative
compensation scheme, based on workers' compensation or disability models."); see also Brickman,
The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991, supra note 133, at 1891-1902; Edley & Weiler,
supra note 59, at 397.
135. See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 133, at 1905-15; Edley & Weiler, supra note 59, at 39799.
136. See Edley & Weiler, supra note 59, at 400.
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"(w)orkers compensation programs are an important source of support
for injured workers in the United States," they are also frequently
"criticized both by the employers who fund them and by the workers
who are supposed to benefit from them."13 7 The Black Lung Act,
arguably more comparable to a proposed administrative alternative to
asbestos litigation because of the similar problem that it was meant to
address, "is regarded by many as a lesson in how compensation
schemes can go awry." 138 The costs of an administrative alternative to
asbestos litigation and its ability to fairly compensate both current
and future claimants were also causes for concern. 139 Finally, none of
the proposed administrative programs managed to effectively address
the problem of liability allocation. 140 By failing to define the role that
the various defendants and the federal government were expected to
play in contributing to the compensation fund, early proposals for an
administrative alternative to asbestos litigation sounded their own
14 1
political death knell.
The recent expansion of asbestos litigation to include many
peripheral defendants would serve to make the implementation of a
no-fault administrative compensation regime even more difficult. 142
Some early administrative proposals called for payments into the
compensation fund to be triggered when a certain number of claims
were filed against a given defendant. 143 Such claims-based triggers
were not a problem while asbestos manufacturers and other front line
defendants remained the primary targets of litigation, as it was clear
that the corporations being sued on such a large scale were
responsible for many asbestos-related injuries. However, as the focus
of litigation has shifted to peripheral defendants with more tenuous
ties to asbestos, questions of fault and causation have become less
137. Deborah R. Hensler, Fashioning a National Resolution of Asbestos Personal Injury
Litigation:A Reply to ProfessorBrickman, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1967, 1985 (1992).
138. Id.; see also Helm, supra note 133, at 657-58 (noting that "hopes for the Black Lung
program... have not been realized" and predicting that an administrative alternative to
asbestos litigation would likely be subject to many of the same problems that have plagued the
Black Lung program).
139. See Hensler, supra note 137, at 1985 (listing a myriad of concerns that led various
groups to oppose plans for an administrative solution).
140. Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos Litigation: A PragmaticApproach, in Asbestos Law and
Litigation: ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials 321, 330-31 (2001), WL SG057 ALI-ABA 321.
141. See id; see also Helm, supra note 133, at 656 (noting a similar failure in the more
recently proposed Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999).
142. See supra Part II.E for a discussion of the increase in claims against peripheral
defendants.
143. See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 133, at 1911 (proposing that a defendant would be
obligated to make payments into the compensation fund once 1500 plaintiffs had filed suit
against it in federal and state courts).
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clear.144 The idea that a defendant with questionable ties to asbestos
injuries could be deprived of the opportunity to prove its innocence
merely because it was one of scores of defendants mentioned in a large
number of suits raises serious equity concerns. Such concerns further
reduce the likelihood that a no-fault administrative alternative to
asbestos litigation could be implemented.
In the late 1990s, after realizing that the wholesale
replacement of tort law by a no-fault asbestos injury compensation
scheme
might be unworkable,
Congress
considered other
administrative alternatives. The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation
Act of 1999 (FACA) provides a good example. 145 FACA proposed
impairment criteria that prospective plaintiffs would have to meet in
order to be eligible for compensation, as well as a mediation procedure
to which all claims would be subject. 146 If the mediation failed to
produce a settlement, the plaintiff could opt for adjudication by an
administrative law judge. 147 The key differences between FACA and
other administrative alternatives to asbestos litigation were the
retention of fault-based liability and the fact that a medically certified
plaintiff could simply opt out of the administrative process either
before or after mediation and instead file a civil action in state or
federal court. 148 FACA could thus be characterized as creating an
administrative prerequisite to a civil action in addition to an optional
administrative claims resolution process.
Like its no-fault administrative predecessors, FACA was
subject to widespread criticism. Its medical criteria and bar on
punitive damages were attacked by the plaintiffs' bar. 149 Some
defendants attacked it as an unnecessary restriction on their ability to
reach settlements through the tort system.1 50 Many observers alleged
that "instead of creating a comprehensive system for compensating
asbestos victims, it merely add[ed] layers of bureaucratic procedure
(and most likely longer delays) to an already complicated and often

144. See supra Part I.E.
145. Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (1999). For a
concise summary of the FACA, see Jody L. Gallegos, Note, Three Decades of Frustration:Finally,
a Solution to the Asbestos Problem, 15 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 61, 74-78 (2000).
146. H.R. 1283 §§ 102-103.
147. Id. § 104(e).
148. Id. §§ 102(f), 104(e).
149. Hanlon, supranote 134, at 332.
150. Owens Corning was the most outspoken of these critics, having recently reached a
series of global settlements with the majority of asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys. Id. While the
settlements reached by Owens Corning proved incapable of saving the company from
bankruptcy, its opposition to FACA played a key role in the bill's ultimate demise. Id.
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protracted process." 15 1 By allowing any plaintiff to access the tort
system after the administrative resolution process, FACA threatened
to make the current asbestos litigation process even more complex and
inefficient, and it did so without the guaranteed claim resolution of an
152
administrative compensation scheme.
Despite its shortcomings, FACA's establishment of medical
criteria would likely have reduced the national asbestos caseload
considerably, and its optional administrative claims resolution process
might have resulted in faster resolution of at least some claims. 153
Nevertheless, FACA was ultimately unable to obtain enough support
to pass either house of Congress. 154 The sound rejection of FACA, a
proposal far less sweeping than the no-fault compensation schemes
discussed earlier, again underscored Congress' general disinclination
to create an administrative regime to deal with the asbestos crisis.
B. Calls for a Judicial Solution

Recognizing congressional reticence to pass extensive asbestos
reform legislation, many would-be reformers have shifted their focus
to the judiciary. 155 These individuals typically admit that federal
legislation would be the ideal means to achieve reform, but argue that
the nation's trial judges can also take steps to fix the problems that
they have helped create.1 56 In this context, many scholars have
suggested meaningful reforms to alleviate the asbestos litigation crisis
and preserve assets for future claimants.1 57 Some judges have even

151. Helm, supra note 133, at 656.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Hanlon, supra note 140, at 332.
155. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 54, at 344-45; Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 15356; Faulk, supra note 20, at 661; Rothstein, supra note 20, at 28-31. See generally Schwartz &
Lorber, supra note 24.
156. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 54, at 335 ("Courts should no longer wait for congressional
or legislative action to correct common law errors made by the courts themselves. Mistakes
created by courts can be corrected by courts without engaging in judicial activism." (quoting
Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1399 (3d Cir. 1993))); Rothstein, supra note 20, at 30, 33-34 ("In the
absence of federal legislation, judges must look outside their own 'asbestos fiefdoms' and make
decisions that will help resolve the problem at a national level."); Schwartz & Lorber, supra note
24, at 249, 267-68 (arguing that actions by trial judges have contributed to the current asbestos
litigation crisis, and that only those same trial judges can "restore the rule of law in asbestos
cases"); Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 71, at 548-49 ("While additional measures may be
introduced in Congress, until Congress acts, the solution to the problem lies with the state
judges before whom most asbestos cases are brought.").
157. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 54, at 346-57 (calling for inactive docket programs, a bar
on punitive damages and the end of mass consolidations); Rothstein, supra note 20, at 26-32
(proposing an end to punitive damages, strict joinder rules to prohibit forum shopping, and
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responded to these calls, taking the initiative by barring claims 1by
58
unimpaired plaintiffs or taking steps to end punitive damages.
While these judges are to be commended for their efforts, even the
most cursory survey of the current asbestos litigation landscape
reveals that their actions have not had a tremendous impact on the
159
asbestos morass as a whole.
The claim that grass roots judicial action will ever fully resolve
the asbestos litigation crisis is dubious at best. Global reforms are
necessary to affect a global solution. 160 It is highly unlikely that such
global reforms will or even can be implemented by judges.' 6 1 Asbestos
plaintiffs have responded to reforms implemented by some judges by
simply taking their claims before other judges who are not so reformminded, a scenario which is made possible by the liberal joinder rules
applied in some state courts. 162 As long as there is one such judge in
one such state court, judicial reforms alone cannot bring an end to the
asbestos litigation crisis.
This is not to say that such judicial reforms are useless. Quite
the contrary, they can be helpful in certain situations, and might serve
as a valuable stopgap measure to stem the tide of defendant
bankruptcies until a better solution can be implemented. However, if
the national asbestos litigation debacle is to be finally and effectively
resolved, something other than piecemeal judicial reforms will be
necessary.
C. Attempts at a Global Settlement
For a brief time during the 1990s, it appeared that the asbestos
crisis might be resolved without the help of Congress or the judiciary.
During that period, asbestos litigants agreed to two separate proposed
class action settlements, either of which might have paved the way for
global resolution of all asbestos claims. 63 Unfortunately, the United
transfer procedures allowing more cases to be heard by fewer judges); Schuck, supra note 33, at
568-81 (offering a detailed proposal for inactive docket programs); Schwartz & Lorber, supra note
24, at 269-71 (arguing that courts should require plaintiffs to prove actual causation against
particular defendants and that severe limitations on discovery should be abandoned).
158. See, e.g., In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding the MDL Panel's
decision to sever claims for punitive damages in all asbestos suits filed in federal courts, and
urging state courts to do the same); Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 149-53 (discussing the
Collins decision); Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 71, at 552 (noting that courts in
Massachusetts, Chicago, and Baltimore have implemented some form of inactive docket system).
159. See supra Part II.
160. See Rothstein, supranote 20, at 28-34 ("A global view is needed.").
161. See supranotes 130-132 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text
163. See Hensler, supra note 22, at 1904-06.
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States Supreme Court determined that class certification was not
appropriate in either case. 164 In the process, the Court effectively
ended any hope for a privately negotiated global settlement 165 and
166
strongly underscored the need for legislative intervention.
The proposed settlement in Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, the
first asbestos class action case, was the result of prolonged
negotiations between leading asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys and the
representatives of twenty primary asbestos defendants who comprised
the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR). 167 These negotiations
produced a tentative settlement that would have resolved all pending
and future asbestos claims against the CCR's membership. 168 A
complaint filed against the CCR on January 15, 1993, identified nine
plaintiffs who purported to represent a class of all persons who had
not filed an asbestos-related lawsuit against a CCR member, but who
1 69
had been exposed to asbestos or had a family member so exposed.
On the same day the complaint was filed, the parties presented the
District Court with a one hundred plus page settlement stipulation
detailing a complex schedule of payments to class members who
satisfied designated medical criteria. 170 The stipulation required the
CCR to pay specified sums to any claimants with mesothelioma, other
asbestos-related cancers, or asbestosis. 17 1 Claims by unimpaired
plaintiffs were noncompensable. 172 In exchange for these concessions,
CCR members agreed to forego any defenses to liability, including
waiving any otherwise applicable statutes of limitations. 173 While a
limited number of plaintiffs were allowed to opt out of the settlement
each year in order to pursue traditional tort claims, they were barred
from seeking punitive damages.1 74 After reviewing and approving this
proposed settlement, the District Court issued a preliminary

164. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997).
165. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 ("[W]e recognize the gravity of the question whether class
action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given to legions so
unselfconscious and amorphous.").
166. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ('[W]e are not free to devise an
ideal system for adjudicating these claims.... [T]he 'elephantine mass of asbestos cases' cries
out for a legislative solution." (citation omitted)).
167. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599-602.
168. Id. at 601-02.
169. Id. at 602.
170. Id. at 601-03.
171. Id. at 603-04.
172. Id. at 604.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 605.
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injunction against all class members, stopping them from filing any
asbestos related claims against CCR members.175
The proposed settlement did not fare as well at the appellate
court level. Expressing concerns about the potential divergence of
interest among and lack of notice to class members, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) ordered the class
decertified and vacated the District Court's injunction. 176
The
Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision on the grounds
that the proposed class failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 177 Essentially, the Court
concluded that the class action vehicle, as outlined in the Federal
178
Rules, was incapable of addressing the asbestos crisis.
Another attempt at a global asbestos settlement met a similar
fate two years after Amchem. 179 The Ortiz case revolved around an
attempt by Fibreboard Corporation and its insurers to reach a global
asbestos settlement under a limited fund theory.1 80
The parties
agreed to put aside $1.535 billion to settle the claims of a mandatory
class consisting of (1) any person with an asbestos-based personal
injury claim against Fibreboard who had not yet filed their claim by
August 27, 1992, (2) any person who had dismissed such a claim but
reserved the right to bring a future action against Fibreboard, and (3)
the relatives of class members exposed to Fibreboard asbestos.1 8 1 The
proposed class excluded anyone with currently pending claims against
Fibreboard, as well as anyone who had previously negotiated to
dismiss a claim against Fibreboard and retained the right to file
another only upon developing an asbestos-related cancer.18 2 The
would be class representatives justified their attempt at certification

175. Id. at 608.
176. Id. at 609-11.
177. Id. at 622-29. The Court found the class lacking in three separate ways. First, it failed
to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement that '[common] questions of law or fact ... predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members."' Id. at 622 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)). Second, the Court ruled that divergent interests of the currently injured (who sought
to maximize immediate payouts) and the unimpaired (who sought to preserve CCR assets for
future payments) prevented the named parties from fairly and adequately protecting the
interests of the class as required by Rule 23(a)(4). Id. at 625-28. Finally, the Court held that not
all members of the proposed class had received adequate notice of its formation. Id. at 628.
178. See id. at 629 ("Rule 23... cannot carry the large load CCR, class counsel, and the
District Court heaped upon it."); see also Hensler, supra note 22, at 1906 ("The Court's decisions
[in Amchem and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)] placed large and seemingly
insurmountable barriers along the pathways to the resolution of asbestos litigation.").
179. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815.
180. Id. at 821-30.
181. Id. at 824-26.
182. Id. at 826.
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by arguing that it was necessary in order to ensure that sufficient
insurance funds would be available to compensate all class
members.183
As in Amchem, the Supreme Court was not convinced :that
class certification was proper.184
The Court expressed "serious
constitutional concerns ...with any attempt to aggregate individual
tort claims on a limited fund rationale." 18 5 Initially, the Court noted
that the mandatory nature of the class in combination with the
settlement agreement would likely violate the Seventh Amendment's
right to a jury trial for absent class members.18 6 The Court also noted
that the due process rights of absent class members could be violated
if they were forced to comply with a judgment in a case where they
were neither designated as parties nor served with process.18 7 Finally,
the Court expressed concerns over the manner in which the fund's
limit had been determined, the fact that some parties with unsettled
1 88
claims were excluded, and the potential for intraclass conflicts.
After considering all of these issues, the Supreme Court rejected the
proposed class, claiming that it failed to satisfy Rules 23(a) and
23(b) (1) (B). 189
Amchem and Ortiz make it clear that a global resolution of the
asbestos crisis cannot be achieved through class action settlements. 90
While the holdings in both cases were based on "rules formalism," it is
clear that the Court's decisions were motivated by its concerns about
conflicts of interests between differently situated and current and
future class members. 191 Because these conflicts would exist in any
global class of asbestos plaintiffs, it is apparent that the class action
192
vehicle is incapable of resolving the asbestos crisis.
In determining that class action settlements were not the
answer to the asbestos problem, the Supreme Court underscored the
need for a legislative solution. The Justices themselves noted that the
problem had grown beyond their control and implored Congress to

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
barriers

Id. at 827.
Id. at 864-65.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 846-48.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 864.
See supra note 178.
Hensler, supra note 22, at 1905-06.
See id. at 1906 ("The Court's decisions placed large and seemingly insurmountable
along the pathways to the resolution of asbestos litigation ....
").
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take action. 193 The fourth section of this Note proposes a plan for
Congress to follow in responding to the Supreme Court's plea.
IV.

A TARGETED LEGISLATIVE TORT REFORM PROPOSAL
A. Why a Federal Tort Reform Statute?

Tort reform is the only remaining option. Given Congress's
steadfast opposition to an administrative alternative and the apparent
impossibility of global settlement through class actions, tort reform
seems to be the only available avenue to address the asbestos
morass. 194
Even if an administrative alternative were a viable solution,
however, tort reform would remain the preferable means of dealing
with the asbestos problem.
The superiority of tort reform is
illustrated by the relatively recent extension of asbestos litigation to
encompass peripheral defendants with more tenuous ties to asbestos
and more questionable culpability. 195 The tort system is much better
suited to respond and adapt to this and other changes in the course of
asbestos litigation. Additionally, more idealistic concerns regarding
the right of both plaintiff and defendant to have their day in court also
favor the continued use of the tort system for asbestos claims
resolution.
Given that tort reform is both more realistic and more
desirable than an administrative compensation regime, the
fundamental realities of asbestos litigation mandate that such reform
be achieved by a federal statute as opposed to judicial intervention or
state legislation. Due to the inconsistent treatment of asbestos cases
in different jurisdictions and the wide-scale forum shopping discussed
above, the prospects for effectively resolving the asbestos crisis
through judicially imposed reforms are grim. 196 In addition, relying
upon state legislatures to enact tort reforms would likely result in a
patchwork approach, with asbestos litigation continuing to migrate to

193. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that "the 'elephantine mass
of asbestos cases' cries out for a legislative solution" (citation omitted)); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 587-99 (1997) (recounting and reiterating calls for Congress to intervene
in the asbestos crisis).
194. See supra Part III.A, C; see also Hanlon, supra note 140, at 339 ("Experience shows...
that to have any chance of success legislation must work with the tort system not against it.").
195. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Parts II.F, III.B.
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the states that provided plaintiffs with the most favorable forum. 197
Therefore, federal implementation of global tort reform legislation is
the only means by which the problems plaguing asbestos litigation can
198
be effectively addressed.
There are certainly those who will criticize any proposal for a
federal asbestos tort reform statute on the grounds that it is
unrealistic. It is admittedly true that Congress has long proven either
unable or unwilling to take significant steps to alleviate the asbestos
problem. 199 It is equally true that this inaction has persisted despite
pleas for legislative action from numerous commentators, committees,
and even the Supreme Court. 200 Congress' longstanding refusal to
intervene has led many to conclude that resolution of the asbestos
20
crisis through federal legislation is a lost cause.
While acknowledging Congress's history of unwillingness to
enact an asbestos reform statute, this Note contends that several
recent developments portend a change in that attitude.
The
acceleration in the rate of defendant bankruptcies and the expansion
of the litigation to include businesses in almost every sector of the
American economy has led to increased national media attention for
asbestos litigation. 20 2 These trends are likely to increase public
pressure on Congress to address the asbestos issue. The increasingly
wide-ranging coalition of parties supporting asbestos reform is also
encouraging, as a lack of consensus has derailed proposed reform

197. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text (describing the migration of asbestos
litigation in response to the implementation of asbestos reforms and to favorable verdicts in
particular jurisdictions).
198. But see Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 71, at 548 ('The solution to the asbestos
problem, if there is to be one, will most likely have to come from the states, particularly the state
courts.").
199. The lone contribution of Congress to date has been 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000), a
simplified bankruptcy provision available to asbestos defendants, which, at least with regards to
protecting the interests of future plaintiffs, has done more harm than good. See Issacharoff,
supra note 29, at 1931, 1938-39. For an overview of various asbestos reform statutes considered
and rejected by Congress, see Hanlon, supra note 140, at 329-32.
200. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 865 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
("[Tihe 'elephantine mass of asbestos cases,' cries out for a legislative solution." (citation
omitted)); see also AD Hoc COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 54, at 27 (calling on Congress to
enact "a national legislative scheme to come to grips with the impending disaster relating to
resolution of asbestos personal injury disputes"); Hanlon, supra note 140, at 333-39 (arguing that
only federal legislation can balance the interests of current and future plaintiffs and defendants,
and calling on Congress to adopt such legislation).
201. See supra note 156.
202. See, e.g., Faulk, supra note 20, at 658-59; Berenson, supra note 21; Brickman, supra
note 46; Lawyers for Asbestos Reform, supra note 29; Parloff, supra note 2, at 170 (describing the
"palpable sense that the wheels are simply coming off the asbestos wagon"); Warren,supra note
1.
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legislation in the past. 203 In perhaps the most hopeful sign of all, the
Senate Judiciary Committee held informational hearings on asbestos
on September 25, 2002, with the goal of "laying the groundwork for
attention to the issue in the 108th Congress." 20 4 The fact that the 2002
elections placed the Republican Party in control of Congress increases
the likelihood that these hearings will ultimately result in some sort of
asbestos reform legislation. 20 5
In short, the momentum for an
asbestos reform statute is mounting. 20 6 While Congress might still be
hesitant to enact a sweeping tort reform statute or administrative
compensation program, all signs indicate that it would seize the
opportunity to enact "a pragmatic bill that focuses on the unique
problem of asbestos litigation and checks wider agendas at the
door. '20 7 This Note proposes such a bill.
B. What Should the Statute Do?
1. Get Asbestos Cases into Federal Court
A core component of this Note's proposed asbestos reform
statute is a relaxed federal subject matter jurisdiction requirement for
asbestos litigation. Currently, federal law allows a state law tort
claim to be removed to federal court only when there is complete
diversity among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds

203. See Hanlon, supra note 134, at 129 (arguing that legislation is unlikely to succeed
unless it has "the support of at least some of the plaintiffs' trial bar, claimants, and organized
labor" in addition to that of the asbestos defendants). Groups supporting asbestos reform
legislation now include, in addition to obvious choices such as the Asbestos Alliance and the
National Association of Manufacturers, the American Bar Association and a portion of the
plaintiffs' bar. See Lawyers for Asbestos Reform, supra note 29; Parloff, supra note 2 at 170; see
also AM. BAR ASS'N, COMM'N ON ASBESTOS LITIG. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Feb.

2003) [hereinafter ABA COMMISSION REPORT], (recommending that Congress adopt provisions
that would bar claims by unimpaired plaintiffs), http//www.abanet.org/leadership/full-report.pdf.
204. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 203, at 18. The text of these hearings is
available on the Senate Judiciary Committee website.
205. See, e.g., Mayhem in Madison County, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2002, at A14 (noting that
Republican control of the Senate is likely to "rein in" abuses in asbestos litigation), 2002 WL-WSj
103128087. But see Parloff, supra note 2, at 170 (arguing that any asbestos reform statute under
discussion while President George W. Bush is in office is likely to be derided as a bailout for
Halliburton, the former firm of Vice President Dick Cheney).
206. This point is further borne out by the fact that the Senate Judiciary Committee is
currently considering a sweeping asbestos reform bill that was introduced by Orrin Hatch after
the completion of this Note but before its scheduled publication.
207. Hanlon, supra note 134, at 129; see also Parloff, supra note 2, at 170 (noting that many
proponents of asbestos reform have concluded that only a narrowly tailored piece of legislation
could obtain the necessary support).
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$75,000.208 While the amount in controversy requirement is certainly
met in the vast majority of asbestos cases, the large numbers of
defendants named by a typical plaintiff decreases the chances that
complete diversity will exist. 20 9 Common sense dictates that complete
diversity will be a particularly difficult standard to meet in cases
involving mass consolidation of thousands of plaintiffs, many of whom
often hail from different states. 2 10 The difficulty of establishing
diversity jurisdiction in asbestos litigation likely plays a large role in
of asbestos litigation
explaining why less than twenty percent
211
courts.
federal
in
currently takes place
In order to get more asbestos litigation into federal court, a tort
reform statute should relax the diversity arm of the federal subject
matter jurisdiction requirement to its constitutional minimum. This
would allow a suit to be removed from state to federal court whenever
any plaintiff and any defendant were domiciliaries of different
states. 21 2 Given the large numbers of defendants named in the typical
complaint and the large number of plaintiffs whose claims are often
consolidated for a single trial, it is likely that this relaxed standard
will be satisfied in the overwhelming majority of asbestos personal
injury cases. 213 Moving asbestos litigation into federal courts would
and
immediately begin to address the problems of forum shopping
21 4
litigation.
asbestos
plague
currently
inconsistent treatment that
Knowing that their cases will almost certainly end up in
federal court regardless of the state in which they are filed, plaintiffs
will lose their motivation to forum shop among various state
jurisdictions. 215 Removing asbestos claims to federal court would
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). Note that complete diversity means that no plaintiff is from
the same state as any defendant.
209. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
212. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) ("Article III poses
no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any
Relaxing the diversity requirement to its
two adverse parties are not co-citizens.").
constitutional minimum is an idea that has previously been discussed in the wider, more general
mass tort context. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal
Multiparty, Multiform Jurisdiction,135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986).

213. See supra notes 58, 125 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part II.F.
215. It is true that differences in state substantive law will still govern the cases in federal
court absent any controlling federal law on the issue. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938) (holding that, in the absence of controlling federal law, federal courts are to apply
state substantive law in diversity cases). This Note takes this into account, however, proposing
See infra Part IV.C.
that controlling federal law be implemented where necessary.
Furthermore, differences in state substantive law, to the extent that they may exist, do not
appear to be the primary motivating factor behind forum shopping in asbestos litigation.
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negate the influence of state judges and juries, as they would no
longer be hearing the cases. Enactment of other statutory provisions
proposed in this Note would have the same effect with regard to
relevant state procedural rules.2 16 Upon realizing that these factors
would no longer have any impact, plaintiffs would lose their primary
incentive for forum shopping.
Relaxing the diversity requirement would also ensure the
consistent treatment of the vast majority of asbestos cases, at least at
the critical pretrial stage. 217 Once in federal court, all asbestos cases
will be sent to the MDL Panel for pretrial proceedings before Judge
Charles R. Weiner. 218 Obviously, having all cases handled by a single
judge is the best way to ensure consistent treatment. In addition,
Judge Weiner has considerable experience dealing with asbestos
litigation and has demonstrated a remarkable ability to facilitate
settlements. 2 19 The value of this ability would only be enhanced by
enabling him to oversee more cases.
2. Implement a Statutory Inactive Docket Program To Stop Claims by
the Unimpaired
Any judge, even one as experienced in dealing with asbestos
litigation as Judge Weiner, would be overwhelmed if he was suddenly
asked to schedule for trial all of the country's pending and future
asbestos claims. However, if Congress took no action other than
relaxing the federal subject matter jurisdiction requirement in
asbestos litigation, it would essentially be asking Judge Weiner to do
just that. Fortunately, there is a way for Congress to avoid this
problem while simultaneously helping to ensure that current and

Instead, this wide-scale forum shopping has resulted from asbestos plaintiffs' recognition that
the procedural rules, judges, and juries in certain jurisdictions tend to result in higher verdicts
for plaintiffs. See supra notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
216. State procedural rules must give way to federal statutes so long as the latter are
"rationally capable of classification as either" substantive or procedural. See Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). In other words, a federal statute that is even arguably procedural will
trump a state procedural rule.
217. See Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 144 ("95% to 98% of [asbestos] cases... settle
out of court prior to trial."). The fact that such a small percentage of asbestos cases actually go to
trial underscores the importance of pretrial proceedings in the field.
218. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422-24 (J.P.M.L. 1991);
Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 16.
219. See Trudy Y. Hartzog & Wade H. Logan, III, The Nuts and Bolts of Multidistrict
Litigation, S.C. LAW., July-Aug. 1996, at 20, 22 (explaining that Judge Weiner was chosen to
oversee the MDL Panel because of his experience with asbestos litigation); J. Stratton Shartel,
Litigators Split on Fairnessof Proposed Asbestos Settlements, INSIDE LITIG., June 1992, at 1, 27
(noting that Judge Weiner encourages defendants to enter into settlement of present cases).
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future sick plaintiffs receive timely and adequate compensation for
their injuries.
Preventing claims by unimpaired plaintiffs would address
many of the problems plaguing asbestos litigation. It would help stop
the defendant bankruptcies that negatively impact wide sectors of the
economy, aid in preserving assets to compensate those truly injured by
asbestos, and greatly reduce Judge Weiner's newly enhanced
caseload. 220 Congress could achieve this feat by implementing an
inactive docket program for asbestos litigation. 2 21 Because such
programs have been discussed at length elsewhere, this Note only
undertakes to recount the essential features. 222 Initially, all claimants
are put onto an inactive docket, where they remain until an
independent medical evaluation certifies that they meet designated,
clearly defined impairment criteria. 223 When such certification is
obtained, the claimant is removed from the inactive docket and placed
on the active docket. 224 Finally, as long as claimants remain on the
inactive docket, the statutes of limitations for their claims are tolled,
and discovery is not permitted. 225 By implementing an inactive docket
program that adheres to these basic guidelines, Congress could help to
ensure that current and future sick claimants are compensated while
also reducing the number of asbestos cases clogging the nation's court
226
dockets by as much as ninety percent.
Because inactive docket programs would solve the massive
problems posed by unimpaired asbestos plaintiffs, Congress should
pass a generally applicable law mandating that they be implemented
for all asbestos litigation nationwide. 227 Such a reform has long been
220. See generally supraPart II.B.
221. For an overview of inactive docket programs and the arguments favoring their adoption,
see Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 6-8; Schuck, supra note 33, at 542, 594. The idea of
inactive docket programs for unimpaired asbestos plaintiffs has its roots in Professor Schuck's
article.
222. See, e.g., Behrens & Parham, supra note 33, at 9-11.
223. Id. at 8.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
227. Despite the fact that the subject matter jurisdiction relaxation will result in essentially
all asbestos litigation taking place in federal court, it is important that the statute mandating
inactive dockets apply to cases in state courts as well. As noted previously, state substantive law
controls litigation that takes place in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. See supra note
215. Because inactive docket programs would effectively strip an unimpaired plaintiff of a cause
of action that might have been recognized under state law, they are most likely correctly
classified as substantive rather than procedural. It is therefore vital that that Congress make it
clear that this provision of the asbestos reform statute is controlling in any courtroom in the
United States. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution clearly gives Congress
the power to implement such a law in the context of asbestos litigation. See Gallegos, supra note
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advocated by many scholars, has recently been endorsed by the
American Bar Association, and is rumored to be under serious
discussion in Congress. 228
It was also an accepted part of the
attempted global settlement overturned by the Supreme Court in
Amchem. 229 While implementation of such a program would not
single-handedly solve all of the problems plaguing asbestos litigation,
it would constitute a substantial step in the right direction.
3. Stop Unjustified Punitive Damages Awards
Ending punitive damages awards in asbestos litigation is
another important step towards assuring that sufficient resources are
available to compensate future asbestos victims. As discussed above,
punitive damages have long since ceased to fulfill their intended
purpose in the asbestos context. 230 They now serve as little more than
a windfall that current claimants receive at the expense of future
plaintiffs and as a means of exacerbating the other problems plaguing
asbestos litigation. 231 Any attempt at comprehensive asbestos reform
must therefore address the issue of punitive damages.
There are at least three ways in which Congress could address
concerns about punitive damages. A federal statute barring punitive

145, at 75-76 (noting that barring claims by unimpaired plaintiffs in asbestos cases infringes on
state tort law, but that the Commerce Clause gives the federal government the power to do so);
Pamela M. Madas, Note, To Settlement Classes and Beyond: A Primer on Proposed Methods for
Federalizing Mass Tort Litigation, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 540, 565 (1997) (arguing for the
adoption of federal substantive law to deal with all mass torts).
The author contends that state tort law should generally be left untouched to the extent
practicable; this is the very reason for merely extending federal subject matter jurisdiction over
asbestos cases instead of passing a statute creating federal substantive law to govern every
aspect of every asbestos claim. Effectively and uniformly addressing the problems posed by
unimpaired claimants in asbestos litigation is so vital to reforming the asbestos litigation process
and protecting the interests of future impaired claimants that this limited inroad into state tort
law seems justified. This justification is further underscored by the fact that, due to the current
prevalence of forum shopping in asbestos litigation, the claims heard in many state courts are
not brought by residents of those states. See, e.g., supra note 125. When states are not hearing
the claims of their own citizens, their traditional interest in overseeing state tort law causes of
action is substantially undercut.
228. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 203 (advocating the adoption of a
medical criteria bill applicable to state and federal courts, and discussing reports that several
members of Congress are currently pondering introducing such a bill); Behrens & Parham, supra
note 33; Schuck, supra note 33.
229. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part IID.
231. See In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000) (arguing against punitive damage
awards in asbestos cases). See generally Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33 (discussing the
disadvantages of imposing punitive damages in asbestos cases); Rothstein, supra note 20, at 2628; supra Part I.D.
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damages in asbestos litigation is the most obvious and desirable. 232
Proposals advocating such bans have proven extremely controversial
in the past, however, and the inclusion of such a provision in the
asbestos reform bill would be unwise if it meant jeopardizing that
bill's passage. 233 If a complete bar on punitive damages proves
politically unrealistic, Congress should include a provision requiring
that all claims for punitive damages be severed prior to trial, to be
heard only after all compensatory awards have been determined and
paid. 234 The MDL Panel adopted such a policy years ago in an effort to
preserve funds for future claimants without venturing into the
uncertain ground of striking claims for punitive damages
altogether. 23 5 Receiving a statutory sanction from Congress would
bolster the procedure's credibility, delivering what would be a needed
236
shot in the arm in light of the expanded diversity jurisdiction.
Finally, if even statutorily adopting the MDL Panel's severance policy
for punitive damages proved too politically volatile, Congress could
choose to leave the matter in the hands of the MDL Panel absent any
statutory modification. This would certainly be the path of least
resistance, but it is also the course of action with the least chance of
237
adequately addressing the punitive damages problem.
232. While completely barring claims for punitive damages would likely be considered
substantive, it is clearly within the scope of the federal government's Commerce Clause power to
take this action. See supra note 222.
233. See Hanlon, supra note 140, at 332-33. Hanlon notes that provisions for limiting
punitive damages and attorney's fees have ensured the defeat of asbestos reform bills in the past,
as they ensured opposition not only from the asbestos plaintiffs' bar, but from plaintiffs' lawyers
generally. Id. He argues that an asbestos reform statute should avoid such "polarizing issues"
as limitations on punitive damages. Id. But see Helm, supra note 133, at 644-46 (noting that the
attempted global class action settlement of asbestos cases struck down by the Supreme Court in
Ortiz after being accepted by the plaintiff class contained a bar in punitive damages and also
placed a cap on each claimant's possible recovery).
234. See Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 156 (urging that state courts adopt this
practice if they are uncomfortable with severing claims for punitive damages outright). Again,
authority for such a statute could be drawn from the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. See supra note 222.
235. In Dunn v. Hovic, the Third Circuit held that while punitive damage awards in asbestos
cases were a cause of concern, it was not the role of the courts to resolve the conflicting policy
arguments. 1 F.3d 1371, 1387 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to bar all punitive damage awards in
asbestos litigation). However, seven years later the Third Circuit specifically condoned the MDL
Panel's practice of severing claims for punitive damages. Collins, 233 F.3d at 812 (noting that
the policy would help to ensure that "'the sick and dying, their widows and survivors ...have
their claims addressed first"' (quoting In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2000))).
236. By embodying the process in a federal statute, Congress would ensure that it continued
to withstand any legal challenges, as the process certainly satisfies the "arguably classifiable as
procedural" test established in Hanna. See supra notes 210, 227.
237. -It
islikely that the statute authorizing the transfer to the MDL Panel already provides
sufficient statutory justification for the severance to qualify for the lenient Hanna test described
supra notes 216 and 227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000) ("[T]he panel may separate any claim,
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Any restriction on punitive damages in asbestos litigation,
regardless of how it is pursued by Congress, will be subject to criticism
on the grounds that it is unfair to future plaintiffs. It is true that
limiting, delaying, or barring punitive damages will necessarily result
in some future plaintiffs not receiving the same level of compensation
as some previous plaintiffs. However, this argument fails to consider
the fact that many future plaintiffs are likely to recover nothing at all
if punitive damage awards continue to go unchecked. 238 There is no
point in taking measures to reserve future plaintiffs' rights to the
highest possible recovery when the practical effect of those measures
will be to prohibit any recovery at all. 23 9 In this instance, it is also
important to remember that "[p]unitive damages are a windfall to the
recipients over and above compensatory damages to which they are
entitled. '240 Quite simply, the interest of future plaintiffs in retaining
the right to receive this windfall fails to outweigh the clear need to
limit "the hemorrhaging effect of punitive damages in asbestos
cases." 24 1 The argument that limiting punitive damages is unfair to
future plaintiffs, therefore, is not a strong one.

cross claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the
remainder of the action is remanded."); see also Collins, 233 F.3d at 811 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1407(a), and upholding the MDL Panel's right to sever claims for punitive damages in asbestos
litigation). However, if this is determined not to be the case, then the MDL Panel's severance
practice will be subject to stricter scrutiny. Joseph Glannon explains that conflicts between a
federal judicial practice and state law are also resolved under Hanna but are subject to a
different test. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 195 (4th
ed. 2001). In such cases, the proper test is whether the federal practice would prove outcome
determinative in that it would lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the law.
Id. Whether severing punitive damages claims would be considered outcome determinative after
the passage of the statute expanding federal subject matter diversity jurisdiction is a question
whose definitive answer lies beyond the scope of this Note. However, it is at least arguable that
the practice would not prove outcome determinative, as virtually all claims will go to federal
court (hence no forum shopping) and would all be subject to this practice (no inequitable
administration of the law).
238. See Collins, 233 F.3d at 812 ("The resources available to persons injured by asbestos are
steadily being depleted.... It is responsible public policy to give priority to compensatory claims
over exemplary punitive damage windfalls ....
").See generally supra Parts ILA, D.
239. The author is reminded of Reg's perplexity at Francis' proposal that the PFJ fight the
oppressors for Stan's right to have babies. MONTY PYTHON'S LIFE OF BRIAN (Home Vision
Entertainment 1979) ("What's the point of fighting for his right to have babies when he can't
have babies?!").
240. Collins, 233 F.3d at 812.
241. Behrens & Parsons, supra note 33, at 137.
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4. Limit Successor Liability and Protect Peripheral Defendants
Awards based on successor liability in asbestos litigation have
long since outgrown the doctrine's theoretical underpinnings. 242 The
doctrine is useful in theory, however, as it prevents a guilty party from
avoiding liability by simply being absorbed into a larger corporate
entity. 243 Congress should therefore implement a cap on the amount
of damages that can be awarded against any asbestos defendant under
a theory of successor liability. 244 Professor Brickman has proffered
two formulations for such a cap, and this Note proposes that Congress
adopt the calculation producing the higher yield for truly sick
plaintiffs. 24 5 Therefore, the proposed asbestos reform statute should
include a provision limiting successor liability to "the price of the
acquisition (of the offending company) adjusted for any profits or
losses sustained since the acquisition in addition to whatever
insurance coverage of the acquired company was in force [when the
acquired company was purchased] ."246 This formulation is consistent
with the rationale supporting the successor liability doctrine, and
strikes a fair balance between compensating injured plaintiffs and
protecting nonculpable defendants whose only ties to asbestos resulted
from a corporate acquisition. 247
242. See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text; see also Brickman, supra note 23, at
1883 (noting that successor liability as applied in asbestos cases creates an undeserved windfall
for plaintiffs, but that its total elimination would create a shortfall).
244. Again, this will require some incursion into state tort law. Also again, the author feels
that this incursion is justified by the scope and seriousness of the nation's asbestos problem. The
use of successor liability is one of the key factors in allowing asbestos litigation to expand to its
current unmanageable dimensions, and is therefore a justifiable target of federal intervention in
state tort law. See Brickman, supra note 23, at 1881-82.
245. See id. at 1883. The author believes that adoption of the formula more favorable to
plaintiffs is proper for two reasons. First, after the creation of the national inactive docket
program, there are no more worries that funds justly due sick plaintiffs will be usurped by the
unimpaired. Second, choosing the formulation that will result in more money available to
plaintiffs should also make the cap more palatable to asbestos plaintiffs and their attorneys.
246. Id. Although this formula may sound arcane, Professor Brickman argues that "[c]ourts
which have devised the procedurally complex mass consolidations or bankruptcy trust funds
which are becoming the hallmark of asbestos litigation, would not regard the task of
sequestering the assets of the acquired corporation within the acquiror as an unduly burdensome
task." Id. at 1883-84.
247. For a recap of the theories justifying the successor liability doctrine, see supra notes
115-118 and accompanying text. It is important to stress that, when calculated in this manner,
the cap on successor liability damages does not deprive plaintiffs of any compensation to which
they are justly entitled. If not for the fortuitous acquisition of the tortfeasor by another entity,
those injured by the tortfeasor would never have had access to any resources greater than the
value of that company and its insurance. Such an acquisition should not entitle plaintiffs to
compensation in the form of access to the acquiring company's assets; such awards are
"unabashed windfalls." Brickman, supranote 23, at 1884.
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Like runaway application of the successor liability doctrine, the
expansion of liability to peripheral defendants has greatly increased
the scope of asbestos litigation as well as its financial impact on
nonculpable parties. 248
Unlike successor liability, however, the
problems posed by peripheral defendant liability cannot be easily
addressed by direct congressional action. The primary cause of
peripheral defendant liability is the willingness of judges to relax
existing proof of causation requirements and evidentiary standards to
insure that injured plaintiffs receive compensation despite culpable
24 9
defendants' bankruptcies.
Even after moving asbestos litigation to federal courts,
Congress would still be unable to police every courtroom and review
every finding of liability in order to ensure that the law was strictly
applied. Ultimately, the closest Congress could come to directly
addressing the problems surrounding peripheral defendant liability
would be to refer to such problems in the findings and purpose section
of the tort reform statute. Language that indicates congressional
awareness of the problem and emphasizes its seriousness would at
least give judges pause before they allow the imposition of liability
based on speculative proof of causation or questionable scientific
evidence. 250 The rest must be left to the federal trial judges who will
251
be hearing asbestos cases.
While the ways in which Congress can directly address the
problems associated with peripheral defendant liability are limited,
the proposals discussed above may provide some relief in this area.
The implementation of a national inactive docket program combined
with the suspension of punitive damages should do a great deal to
stem the tide of asbestos-related bankruptcies. This, in turn, should
alleviate the pressure on plaintiffs to "cast their nets wider" in the
hopes of ensnaring at least some solvent defendants. 252 Hopefully, the
truly impaired claimants who are still allowed to bring claims will
focus on bringing their strongest cases against culpable defendants,
thereby relieving the pressure that asbestos liability currently
imposes on peripheral defendants. Just as the problems currently
plaguing asbestos litigation serve to exacerbate each other, solving
some of them should likewise serve to ameliorate the others.
248. See supra Part lI.E.
249. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 262-64, 269-72 (describing the nation's trial
judges' unwillingness to follow "the rule of law" with respect to peripheral defendants).
250. See id. at 269-71 (citing "junk science" and alternative liability theories as two
significant problems).
251. See id. at 270-71 (urging trial judges to act as "responsible gatekeepers").
252. See supra Part II.E.
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C. What About Mass Consolidations?
Noticeably absent from this Note is any proposal for a ban on
or reform of the mass consolidation of asbestos claims. This absence is
all the more glaring in light of the fact that condemnation of mass
consolidations has traditionally been a unifying theme among
otherwise divergent proposals for asbestos litigation reform. 253 Rather
than join the chorus calling for a ban on mass consolidations, this
Note proposes that such a ban is both impractical and, after the
implementation of the proposals contained herein, unnecessary.
The impracticality of a ban on mass consolidations is partially
A distinguishing
due to the nature of asbestos litigation.
characteristic of asbestos litigation is the fact that "some 85% of the
claims on file are represented by only 55 law firms."254 Due to the
concentration of cases among such a small number of firms,
255
"individual treatment of asbestos cases ... (is) largely a myth."
Even if Congress were to enact legislation banning mass
consolidations, asbestos plaintiffs' firms could still continue to
simultaneously negotiate settlements on behalf of their entire stable of
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' attorneys could therefore continue threatening to
discourage settlement of all claims if a given defendant insisted on
taking any claims to court. While defendants could obtain individual
adjudication of cases if they chose to ignore this threat, it is unlikely
that they would choose to do so if it cost them the opportunity to settle
huge numbers of claims out of court. A ban on mass consolidations
would therefore leave the settlement negotiation process effectively
untouched, and would provide minimal relief to most asbestos
defendants.
The sheer volume of asbestos claims also serves to make a ban
on mass consolidations impracticable. There are currently some
600,000 asbestos claimants, and even conservative estimates predict
that that number will rise above one million before the litigation
concludes.2 56 Assuming no change in the ninety-five to ninety-eight
percent rate of out of court settlements in asbestos litigation, these
estimates would result in an absolute minimum of 20,000 asbestos
cases going to trial. 257 Even this number of individual trials would
constitute an extremely heavy burden on the nation's courts, and the
253. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 54, at 349-52; Faulk, supra note 20, at 660-61; Hanlon,
supra note 140, at 338; Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24, at 268-69.
254. Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1930 & n.21.
255. Hensler, supra note 22, at 1913.
256. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 75, 77.
257. See supra note 100.
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actual number of cases would likely be higher. 258 Quite simply,
asbestos litigation has grown beyond the point where courts can hope
to resolve all claims on an individual, case-by-case basis.
In addition to being impractical, a ban on mass consolidations
would be unnecessary if the reforms outlined in this Note were
implemented.
As discussed above, mass consolidations cause or
contribute to five distinct problems in asbestos litigation: (1) by
enabling courts to process claims quickly and cheaply, they encourage
the filing of more claims than they resolve; (2) they lead to jury
confusion and prejudice by combining evidence of plaintiffs with a
wide range of injuries and defendants with a wide range of culpability;
(3) they force defendants to settle claims of questionable merit or risk
being bankrupted by massive jury verdicts; (4) they increase the value
of claims by unimpaired plaintiffs; and (5) they impair the quality of
259
representation received by plaintiffs with varying levels of injury.
All of these concerns are addressed by the tort reform statute proposed
260
above.
Implementation of a nationwide inactive docket program will
have the most significant impact on mass consolidations. By allowing
only impaired plaintiffs to bring their claims to court, the inactive
docket program will effectively cap the number of new claims that can
be filed. Likewise, by ensuring that juries only hear evidence
regarding truly injured plaintiffs, the inactive docket program reduces
the risk of jury confusion and sympathetic awards to undeserving
plaintiffs. While there will still be plaintiffs with varying levels of
impairment, the substantial reduction in pending claims caused by
the inactive docket should allow judges to be more selective in
consolidating their cases, preferably joining only those plaintiffs
whose medical evaluations evince similar injuries.
The inactive
docket program will also relieve the pressure that defendants
currently feel to settle claims of questionable merit, as most of those
claims will be placed on the inactive docket. 26 1 The inactive docket
program will also prevent inflation in the value of claims by the
unimpaired, as those claims will have marginal, if any, value so long

258. See supra note 79.
259. See supra Part II.C.
260. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
261. While the claims of impaired individuals may still present questions of causation with
regard to any particular defendant, there will at least be no doubt that such plaintiffs have been
injured and deserve compensation.
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as they cannot be brought to court.262 Finally, by returning the focus
of attorneys to the relatively small number of impaired claimants, the
inactive docket program will help to ensure that those plaintiffs
receive adequate representation in settlement negotiations.
Other aspects of this Note's proposed tort reform statute will
also help to reduce the harmful effects of mass consolidations. The
statutory language urging federal district courts to strictly require
proof of actual causation should alleviate the pressure for defendants
263
to settle claims for which they do not believe they are liable.
Concerns about jury confusion should also be ameliorated, as judges
should prove more willing to dismiss cases on summary judgment or
directed verdict when a plaintiff fails to establish that a given
defendant caused his or her injuries. Severing punitive damages
claims also will reduce the pressure on defendants to settle cases of
questionable merit, as the likelihood of facing a "bet-the-company
risk" will substantially decrease when only compensatory damages are
at stake. 264 Finally, getting asbestos litigation into federal courts and
under uniform procedural rules should reduce that likelihood that the
265
mass consolidation procedure will be subject to judicial abuse.
With their harmful side effects addressed by this Note's
proposed federal tort reform statute, mass consolidations could
actually become the asset to asbestos litigation envisioned by the first
judges to employ them. As noted, one of the chief problems with
current consolidations is that their fast, efficient adjudication of large
numbers of asbestos claims encourages more filings than they
resolve. 266 Once the inactive docket program reduces the volume of
available claims and the various prejudicial effects of current mass
consolidations are remedied, their ability to efficiently resolve large
numbers of cases should benefit all parties. 267 Finally, if mass
consolidations, the independent medical evaluations mandated by the
inactive docket programs, and the consistent treatment of asbestos
262. Contrast this to the current situation, in which the threat of bringing claims by the
unimpaired to court is used as leverage by plaintiffs' attorneys engaging in settlement
negotiations. See supranotes 95-97 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 93 (describing how some state trial judges have intentionally used mass
consolidation to force defendants to settle claims in an effort to clear the judge's docket).
266. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., CARROLL ET AL., supra note 30, at 60 (noting that more than half of the money
spent on asbestos litigation has gone to cover transaction costs and predicting that, absent some
reform, this percentage is likely to increase in the next decade). Reducing defendant concerns
over claims by the unimpaired and moving legitimate claims through the tort system quickly and
efficiently should help to reduce the percentage of litigation expenses that go to cover transaction
costs, thus benefiting all concerned.
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cases that should occur in federal courts can combine to quickly
establish a relatively narrow range of values for claims based on
certain impairments, it is quite possible that even more cases can be
settled out of court, thus reducing the transaction costs for all parties
268
and perhaps ultimately alleviating the need for mass consolidations.
V.

CONCLUSION

The problems with the current asbestos litigation process are
well documented and almost universally acknowledged.
As the
quagmire continues to expand and its economic impact grows, these
problems will only become more pronounced. Although the nation's
trial judges have had a hand in creating many of these problems, they
have proven woefully incapable of solving them. 269 It is therefore time
for Congress to step in and take decisive action to remedy the nation's
growing asbestos crisis.
In implementing asbestos reform, Congress should take
advantage of the unique nature of the asbestos morass. Just as each
of the problems caused by asbestos litigation exacerbates and
magnifies the others, reforms targeted at some of the problems would
ameliorate the others. It is under this theory that this Note proposes
tort reforms that are narrowly and specifically targeted to eradicate
the asbestos crisis with the least possible congressional effort. It now
falls to Congress to make that effort.
Mark H. Reeves*

268. See Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 1928 (noting the tendency of asbestos litigation and
other high volume mass torts to yield "a highly evolved valuation of claims"). It seems likely
that, once defendants ceased worrying about being blackmailed into settling claims by the
unimpaired, they would be happy to save litigation costs by settling the claims of the truly
impaired at or near their clearly established value. See Warren, supra note 1 (noting that major
asbestos defendants are often sensitive to the dilemma of the truly impaired, and are quite open
to reaching settlements in such cases); supra note 267.
269. See generally Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 24.
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Judy, for the steady stream of asbestos editorials. The author would also like to dedicate this
Note to the memory of Clay Moore, whose name deserves to be in a Law Review.

